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ABSTRACT
The global trade order that has been in place since the end of the
Second World War is now in crisis. Populism has broken out around
the world, embraced by powerful forces in the United States and
Europe. This Article identifies the changes in the nature of the
global constitutional order and domestic markets that resulted in the
legitimacy crisis of the global trade order. We proceed in four
parts. We begin by articulating the concept of a global economic
constitution. We then review the history of successive iterations of
the global economic constitution, starting with the Industrial
Revolution and continuing through the rise of today’s globalized,
integrated markets. In that historical context, we analyze the factors
that explain the current crisis of legitimacy of the international
economic order and that require a transition to a new global
economic order. These include: the rise of a new class of
disadvantaged members of the middle class, whom we call the
“chronically excluded”; fundamental changes in the global supply
chain; the rise of a global middle class competing for existing
opportunities, which exceeds three billion members and which
disproportionately grows in emerging markets; changes in the
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nature of work, the corporation, and the scope and effectiveness of
the governmental regulation. We propose policy and institutional
reforms, accounting for those changes. These proposals will, we
argue, usher in a new global economic constitution, one that will
preserve the legitimacy of the global economic order.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The post-World War II liberalized trade order that enjoyed
widespread acceptance for sixty years1 is now under attack and at
risk of losing its legitimacy. Powerful movements described as
“populist” or “economically nationalist” have become major
political forces in the very Western democracies that invented trade,
pushing for their nations’ withdrawal from globalized markets.2
Why have elections in major Member States of the European Union,
such as Britain and France, become referenda on the very existence
of the European enterprise?3 Why does the term “globalist” elicit
1 See William L. Clayton, GATT, the Marshall Plan, and OECD, 78 Pᴏʟ. Sᴄɪ. Q.
493 (1963) (reviewing the history of the post-World War II Marshall Plan and of the
foundational reforms to the international trade system that removed tariffs and
other regulatory barriers to trade: whereas tariffs had protected powerful minority
economic interests, the Marshall Plan’s infusion of capital into the European
economies after the end of the War, and the concurrent removal of obstacles to
trade, enabled substantial segments of the European population to benefit from
economic growth and achieved cross-border market integration that acted as a
deterrent to conflict); J. Bradford De Long & Barry J. Eichengreen, The Marshall Plan:
History’s Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
3899,
1991),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w3899.pdf
[https://perma.cc/35DQ-P4UD]
(describing that beyond its immediate economic boost, the Marshall Plan enabled
sustained growth for industries, such as coal and steel, that had suffered far greater
disruption during World War II than ever before in their history). Cf. MATTHEW
JOSEPH GABEL, INTERESTS AND INTEGRATION: MARKET LIBERALIZATION, PUBLIC
OPINION AND EUROPEAN UNION 47–55 (2009) (discussing trade liberalization, its
costs and benefits, and its general public approval in Europe after World War II).
2 See generally JOHN B. JUDIS, THE POPULIST EXPLOSION (2016) (discussing how
the great recession and economic pressures lead to a rise in populism around the
world). See also JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? (2016) (discussing and
arguing how populism is truly a rejection of pluralism); BARRY EICHENGREEN, THE
POPULIST TEMPTATION (2018) (discussing the connection between populism and the
economy).
3
Candidates in the 2016 elections in France and the Netherlands who called
for a referendum on EU membership garnered a substantial portion of the votes.
See Kate Lyons & Gordon Darroch, Frexit, Nexit or Oexit? Who Will Be next to Leave
the
EU,
Tʜᴇ
Gᴜᴀʀᴅɪᴀɴ
(June
27,
2016),
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/27/frexit-nexit-or-oexit-whowill-be-next-to-leave-the-eu [https://perma.cc/6YG4-J4MB]. See generally RONALD
R. RAPOPORT & WALTER J. STONE, THREE’S A CROWD: THE DYNAMIC OF THIRD PARTIES,
ROSS PEROT, AND REPUBLICAN RESURGANCE (2008) (discussing how, although there
has always been opposition to trade, it traditionally was the domain of unions,
environmental groups, and other groups representing interests adverse to market
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derision from a wide segment of the general public?4 Why do pillars
of the international investment system, including financial centers
like the United States and the United Kingdom, consider revoking
investment treaties that, for decades, have signaled their
commitment to liberalized capital markets?5 In this Article, we will
liberalization, or nationalists like Ross Perot, a 1992 U.S. Presidential candidate.
Those critiques of trade had a much narrower impact than today’s populist
movement, which stakes a claim to mainstream legitimacy).
4
The term “globalist” has entered the mainstream to become a slur
denouncing advocates of the liberalized trade philosophy and open immigration
policies that were once endorsed by all but fringe groups. It is used regularly by
supporters of President Trump. See, e.g., Ben Shapiro, Why Trump Fans Keep Using
The
Slur
‘Globalist.’,
Dᴀɪʟʏ
Wɪʀᴇ
(Aug.
2,
2016),
http://www.dailywire.com/news/8024/why-trump-fans-keep-using-slurglobalist-ben-shapiro [https://perma.cc/TQ45-QX82] (“[Today,] ‘globalism’ has
become just a slur for Trump’s opponents, just as `neocon’ was disconnected by the
left from its roots in the left-to-right transitional figures like Irving Kristol and used
as a club against anyone who supported the Iraq war . . . .”). See generally YORAM
HAZONY, THE VIRTUE OF NATIONALISM 6 (2018) (“I will understand ‘globalism’ for
what it obviously is—a version of the old imperialism.”).
5 See, e.g., Bob Davis, U.S. Bid to Exit Nafta Arbitration Panels Draws Ire From
Businesses, Wᴀʟʟ Sᴛ. J. (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-bid-toexit-nafta-arbitration-panels-draws-ire-from-businesses-1503423680
[https://perma.cc/73XF-F5CC] (describing a proposal the Trump administration
was organizing in order to allow NAFTA countries to opt out of the ISDS, an
international arbitration system where corporations can sue governments for
actions taken that improperly diminished the value of their foreign investments);
Eric Martin, Trump’s Impatience Emerging as Biggest Threat to Nafta Agreement,
POL.
(Aug.
31,
2017),
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-31/trump-s-impatienceemerging-as-biggest-threat-to-nafta-agreement [https://perma.cc/BH7E-GUPZ]
(describing how President Trump’s repeated threats to withdraw from NAFTA
disrupted re-drafting and negotiation efforts in juxtaposition with the generally
polite atmosphere of the other negotiators); Martin Pengelly, Trump Threatens to
Terminate Nafta, Renews Calls for Mexico to Pay for Wall, Gᴜᴀʀᴅɪᴀɴ (Aug. 27, 2017),
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/27/donald-trump-campdavid-nafta-mexico-wall-canada
[http://perma.cc/4S6N-4T8V]
(recounting
President Trump’s tweets calling NAFTA the “worst trade deal ever made” and
threatening to terminate). See also Joel P. Trachtman, Terminating Trade
Agreements: The Presidential Dormant Commerce Clause versus an Historical
Gloss
Half
Empty
(Oct.
16,
2017)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3015981
[https://perma.cc/5GT3-R6B4]
(noting that the political backlash against trade and associated threats to terminate
trade treaties have generated scholarly commentary analyzing the constitutional
allocation of power to effectuate fundamental changes to the trade commitments of
the United States among executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and the
checks and balances in place).
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answer these and other questions as we ponder the future of global
trade.
Our analysis focuses on the constitutional architecture of the
international trade system and the nature of the basic norms
animating its relationship with the domestic State. In order to secure
legitimacy and function effectively, the international trade order
must reflect the dominant constitutional order of the State at a
particular time in history.6 By way of illustration, a trade system
based on comparative advantage and liberalized cross-border
commerce reflects a society of trading States dedicated to
maximizing collective resources while maintaining effective internal
regulatory power to redistribute wealth. For its part, the domestic
State must continuously adjust its foundational construct to address
a wide array of factors including, among other things, competition
in the international markets, technological advances, and changes in
the nature of work or of the ethos of corporations. When the State
evolves to a new “socio-legal paradigm,” trade governance and
institutions may become obsolete and ineffectual. 7
Today, the rise of economic nationalism and the related crisis of
legitimacy regarding Statecraft and trade governance stem from the
unacknowledged disconnect between the transformation of the
global marketplace and the present de jure status quo of domestic
6
We take issue with scholars who argue that there is a fundamental
inconsistency between liberalized trade and a sovereign and regulatorily
autonomous democratic nation-state, and that opting for free trade by definition
entails sacrificing some of the essential regulatory features of Western democratic
legal systems. Most prominently, Professor Dani Rodrik has posited that there is a
“trilemma” requiring policy-makers to choose among nation-state sovereignty, the
regulatory power of democratically elected representatives to adopt socioeconomic legislation, and free trade. For Rodrik, preserving domestic sovereignty
necessitates a retreat from free trade. See Dani Rodrik, Feasible Globalizations (Nat’l
Bureau
of
Econ.
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
9129,
2002),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9129.pdf
[https://perma.ccBVH3-S3VW]
(claiming that the nation-state system, deep economic integration, and democracy
are mutually incompatible, and that we have to choose between the nation-state
and international economic integration if we want to maintain and deepen
democracy). Rodrik’s trilemma holds that post-Bretton Woods economies must
stem and contain hyperglobalization in order to preserve democratic sovereignty
and national economic management. See id. In our view, as will be detailed below,
the international trade system may be structured so as to enable free movement of
goods without depriving participating states of their sovereign regulatory space, so
long as the trade structure is adjusted to reflect changes in domestic constitutive
legal features.
7
Sonia E. Rolland, Towards Post-Modern Trade Relations?, 5 JURIS. 173 (2014)
(reviewing DENNIS PATTERSON & ARI AFILALO, THE NEW GLOBAL TRADING ORDER:
THE EVOLVING STATE AND THE FUTURE OF TRADE (2008)).
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and international policies. The domestic State continues to rely on
policies and programs that were developed for the pre-globalization
20th century national markets. Because its basic animating principles
are also a reflection of 20th century markets and geopolitics, the
international trade system perpetuates the paralysis. As was the
case before World War II, we find ourselves at a crossroads. It is
essential for policy makers to recognize the need for reform before
the system becomes obsolete. Otherwise, without a proper
foundation, the system crumbles.
In this Article, we will articulate the contours of the new sociolegal paradigm that we believe should govern the State’s basic
construct today, and we will advance policy proposals for a
reformed international economic order. In Part 2, we set forth our
understanding of constitutionalism in the global context. We argue
that a “global economic constitution” governs international markets
and defines the basic components of the relationships among
commercial actors. We call it the “GEC.” We distinguish the GEC
from domestic constitutions in particular because the GEC is not
supreme, immutable, and superordinate. Rather, it is in the nature
of the general architecture of the international order, embodying
foundational norms that evolve through successive iterations that
remain in effect only for discrete periods of time, and do not apply
equally to all groups of actors.8 In Part 3, we will review the history
of the GEC, starting with the Industrial Revolution and continuing
through the rise of today’s globalized, integrated markets. We
divide the GEC into three periods, which we call GEC 1.0, 2.0, and
3.0. For each, we focus on the evolution of its basic norms and
institutions, the relationship between the international and domestic
realms, the economic and social actors to whom alternate norms
apply, and the hallmarks of the legitimacy of the system.
In Part 4, we analyze the factors that explain the current crisis of
legitimacy of the international economic order and require a
transition from GEC 2.0 to GEC 3.0. In Part 5, we expand our
understanding of what confers “legitimacy” on any given
constitutional order, and we identify the basic norms that need to be
overhauled in today’s rising GEC 3.0 order. We propose policy and
institutional reforms, accounting for changes in the nature of work,

8 See generally GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN
WORLD POLITICS (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992) (discussing
the international order as depicted by nine institutional authors).
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the corporation, the scope of governmental regulation, in addition
to transformed international markets and institutions.
2. WHAT IS GLOBAL ECONOMIC CONSTITUTIONALISM?
Is there a global economic constitution? If so, what is it? The
idea of a constitution9 is so familiar, it may strike the reader as
unnecessary of explication. For Americans, the idea of a constitution
is bound up with a written document executed at the nation’s
founding.10 Stating basic principles of liberty and individual rights,
and articulating a structure of government, a constitution of this sort
is essential to the cultural understanding of a polity and is a
constitutive feature of its political institutions. The foundations of
American constitutionalism are fixed at a core and timeless level,
such that all recognized constitutionalists, whatever their political
or legal philosophy, will converge and share (at least some) common
ground.
When we refer to a global economic constitution, on the other
hand, we are not thinking about a projection of the American or
other Western constitutional model on a global scale. Rather, we
have in mind a set of evolving, interlocking, and mutually
reinforcing principles adhered to by a diverse group of sovereign
states that is capable of applying different norms to different groups
of actors. The global economic constitution of which we speak is no
mere congeries of rules, treaties, and laws. To be sure, global
economic constitutionalism is built on principles and institutions
that are both widely shared and, to various degrees, mutually
obligatory. But the main feature of global constitutionalism is the
integration of an economic ethos with a set of institutions, patterns

9
As we will argue, by “constitution” we mean a set of animating principles
wedded to norms and institutions that evolve dynamically.
10 See Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. Cᴀʟ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 551, 555–56 (1985) (noting that the
American Constitution is understood to embody the ratifiers’ beliefs about how the
country was to be governed).
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of inter-state relations, and legal regimes that are more or less all-ofa-piece.11
The global economic constitution differs from a domestic
constitution in three fundamental respects that are pertinent to our
analysis. First, a domestic constitution is always supreme in the
hierarchy of laws.12 The global economic constitution, on the other
hand, does not displace inconsistent domestic measures unless a
complex set of conditions obtains.13 Those conditions evolve over
time, but not until the recent past did international law acquire
limited supremacy, with built-in mechanisms allowing States to
suspend compliance with their treaty obligations on a selective
basis.14
11 See James Tully et al., Introducing Global Integral Constitutionalism, 5 GLOBAL
CONST. 1, 2 (2016) (explaining that global constitutionalism “refers to the global field
of diverse, formal and informal assemblages of laws and governance, norms and
actors that exhibit constitutional qualities.”).
12 See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 221–24 (Max Knight trans., 1967)
(arguing that a constitution states the grounding legal and democratic principles
that its government is obligated to uphold, and because of this is considered the
supreme law in a country to which all other laws must adhere).
13 See, e.g., Antonis Antoniadis, The European Union and WTO Law: A Nexus of
Reactive, Coactive, and Proactive Approaches, 6 WORLD TRADE REV. 45, 46 (2007)
(explaining that it is “well established that the Court of Justice has, in principle,
denied the direct effect of WTO law in the Community and Member States’ legal
orders.”); Armin Von Bogdandy, Pluralism, Direct Effect, and the Ultimate Say: On the
Relationship between International and Domestic Constitutional Law, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L.
404 (2008) (arguing that constitutional law has been “internationalized” and that
the “pyramid” hierarchy of laws has been replaced by a sophisticated coupling of
domestic law and global law). Indeed, the extent to which international law
displaces domestic law is one of the most sensitive constitutive questions of any
international regime. The legitimacy of the system and its acceptance by the partner
States depends on whether the system sufficiently shelters domestic legal
sovereignty. The European Community, by way of example, came close to
disintegrating because France feared that, after the planned transition from
unanimity to majority voting, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice
that gave direct effect to European law and implied a preemption clause, would
unduly expose France to the imposition of European norms. See J.H.H. Weiler, The
Transformation of Europe, 100 Yᴀʟᴇ L.J. 2403, 2406 (1991) (noting that the most
significant change in Europe has been the evolving relationship between the
Community and its Member States).
14
Until the establishment of the World Trade Organization in 1995, GATT
panel decisions were not binding unless all Contracting Parties, including the losing
State, accepted the decision. See William J. Davey, The WTO and Rules-Based Dispute
Settlement: Historical Evolution, Operational Success, and Future Challenges, 17 J. Iɴᴛ’ʟ
Eᴄᴏɴ. L. 679 (2014) (discussing the historical evolution of the WTO dispute
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Second, the domestic constitution speaks to all citizens and
cannot have contradictory constitutional norms for different
actors.15 It would be unthinkable to grant Texans the right to freely
practice religion while restricting New Yorkers to Christianity. The
global economic constitution, on the other hand, can legitimately
impose fundamental norms—such as its anti-discrimination
principles—on one set of actors while exempting others. In fact, the
very survival of the global economic constitution depends on its
ability to operate as a multipolar constitution.16 GEC 2.0, for
example, recognized that emerging economies needed protection to
consolidate.17 The anti-discrimination principles of GEC 2.0, which
enshrined comparative advantage in the basic law of the trade order,
applied to the industrialized economies of the Western modern
liberal democracies.18 The “infant industries” of newly-independent
settlement system); see also Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Remedies Along with Rights:
Institutional Reform in the New GATT, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 477, 479–480 (1994)
(describing the ineffectiveness of GATT panels, “where it was possible for the
losing party before a GATT dispute to block adoption of a panel report, and this
happened not infrequently.”). This was consistent with other institutions like the
International Court of Justice, which could not acquire jurisdiction without the
consent of all parties, and which did not allow individual access to international
justice. See generally SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: AN
ESSAY IN POLITICAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1957) (addressing the political and legal
factors that helped establish the ICJ as well as its function within the international
system).
15 See, e.g., John Rawls, The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, 64
N.Y.U. L. Rᴇᴠ. 233, 234–235 (1989) (positing that a stable democratic regime must
adhere to certain fundamental precepts accepted by diverse citizens who hold
conflicting political and ideological positions).
16 See ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMAN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 115–21 (2012) (discussing the importance of international economic
cooperation through the acceptance of global legal pluralism in its ability to
“enhance ‘voice’ and ‘discursive spaces’ for non-state actors . . . [and provide
symmetric access] to specialized economic regimes and institutions . . . .”).
17 See Alexander Keck & Patrick Low, Special and Differential Treatment in the
WTO: Why, When, and How?, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT & MULTILATERAL TRADE
COOPERATION 147, 147–148 (Simon J. Evenett & Bernard M. Hoekman eds., 2005)
(exploring the role of special and differential treatment in the multilateral trading
system and offering new approaches for their continued utilization).
18 See Uche Ewelukwa, Special and Differential Treatment in International Trade
Law: A Concept in Search of Content, 79 N.D. L. Rᴇᴠ. 831 (2003) (claiming that in the
multilateral trade system developing countries benefit from better market access
for their goods, rather than being subject to neutral application of the principles of
comparative advantage, including, by way of example, certain exemptions from the
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States, on the other hand, continued to be governed by the
protectionist norms of GEC 1.0, which GEC 2.0 had rejected.19
The third difference between a domestic constitution and the
GEC is that the international constitution evolves in successive
epochal iterations that, of necessity, must reject the fundamental
tenets of their predecessor.20 The pattern of evolution of the global
economic constitution follows the same course across each epochal
iteration. The constitutional architecture starts with building blocks
defined by the “inner voice” of the individual States that dominate
the system, their basic law.21 The GEC then coalesces around a set
of principles that operates consistently with domestic Statecraft.22
Over time, the domestic principles evolve, and the GEC must also
transform itself to adjust. In between constitutional epochs, the
international system often traverses a perilous time where, almost
of necessity, its operative norms conflict with domestic law and
expose the system to economic crisis.
Understanding the constitutional architecture of trade and its
evolution is essential to maintaining domestic and international
economic policies that are consistent with one another. The failure
to upgrade economic regimes in a timely fashion creates structural
breakdowns that tend to affect the most vulnerable actors in the
markets. The vulnerable actors of today’s markets form the
backbone of the populist, anti-trade movement. The global
economic order is on the cusp of an epochal change and in the midst
of a transitional and perilous period. The basic norms and
GATT and easier access to overseas markets designed to boost economic
development through exports).
19 See generally SVEN BECKERT, EMPIRE OF COTTON: A NEW HISTORY OF GLOBAL
CAPITALISM (2014). For a superb historical account of protectionism, with special
attention to the US context, see DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, CLASHING OVER COMMERCE: A
HISTORY OF US TRADE POLICY 221–410 (2018).
20
We first advanced the idea of epochal transformation of States in DENNIS
PATTERSON & ARI AFILALO, THE NEW GLOBAL TRADING ORDER (2006). In this Article,
we use digital numbering to identify each epoch of global economic
constitutionalism. See id. In using this numbering, we follow the lead of Alexander
Somek who uses this approach to great effect in ALEXANDER SOMEK, THE
COSMOPOLITAN CONSTITUTION (2015). For a review of that work, see Dennis
Patterson, The Dark Future of Constitutionalism, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 667, 668 (2015)
(book review) (reviewing Alexander Somek’s book, The Cosmopolitan Constitution,
in which he argues that modern constitutionalism has gone through three phases:
power, recognition, and transcendence).
21 See KELSEN, supra note 12, at 215.
22 See, e.g., Rodrik, supra note 6, at 24 (explaining that, while there are many
possible models of feasible globalization, they are limited by the scope of
institutional diversity at the national level).
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assumptions that have animated the trading world since World War
II are undergoing a radical transformation. In the next two Parts of
this Article, we briefly review how the GEC evolved through three
distinct epochal iterations, from the Industrial Revolution to date,
which we will call GEC 1.0, GEC 2.0 and GEC 3.0. In addition to the
constitutional architectural rules of the international system and its
relationship to domestic law, we focus on the economic actors that
are the principal interlocutors of the international system, which we
will also define.
3. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF GEC: FROM THE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION TO THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL
We identify three successive iterations of the international
economic system that can be distinguished from one another based
on their constitutive features. Those we call GEC 1.0, “pre-modern
state-nation,” 2.0, “modern welfare nation-state,” and 3.0,
“postmodern globalized nation-state.”23
We differ from the
prevailing narratives about the evolution of Statecraft and trade in
that we reject both what we call the “positive evolutionary account”
of trade history, and its counterpart—advocated most powerfully by
the prominent economist Dani Rodrik—that there are inherent flaws
in the trade system that make it inconsistent with a democratic,
welfare-promoting State.24 In our narrative, trade and Statecraft
have not evolved toward an optimal system that we must defend as
the best possible structural option. In addition, trade and Statecraft
have the capacity, in any given epoch, to enable the welfare of
market actors on a widespread basis if the right policy choices are
made. In this Part, we outline the historical evolution of Statecraft
and trade with a view to illustrating our thesis.

23 See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE
COURSE OF HISTORY 144–242 (2003).
24 See, e.g., Rodrik, supra note 6, at 13 (“[T]he nation-state system, deep
economic integration, and democracy are mutually incompatible.”).
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3.1. GEC 1.0: From the Industrial Revolution to World War I: StateCentric Growth.
GEC 1.0 spans the period starting with the Industrial Revolution
and ending with World War I. The principal constitutional feature
of GEC 1.0 is what we call a “Union of Delinked States.” The trading
partners and dominating powers in GEC 1.0 included principally
European States and the United States of America.25 GEC 1.0 States
followed an economic ethos, internationally and domestically,
intended to foster and consolidate their internal markets.26
Although some international agreements were signed to enable
trading, “trade was consistently regarded as a form of warfare, as a
vast game of beggar-my-neighbor, rather than as a collaborative
activity from the extension of which all stood to benefit.”27 The
global architecture of GEC 1.0 enabled State-centric policies to
operate virtually free of enforceable international obligations and
International Institutions’ oversight.
This normative and
institutional structure reflected the trading States’ view of the global
markets as competitive fields, from which they would seek to draw
resources to support their internal consolidation enterprise.28

25
Of course, active trade outside the Western world predated GEC 1.0. The
Silk Road trade and the Arabian sheikdom, for example, predate European
commerce. See Rolland, supra note 7, at 179. However, we focus on the powers that
led to the establishment of the modern trade system.
26 See MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 10–14 (1997) (illustrating
the mercantilist mindset, where states viewed their trade with neighbors as zerosum and mutually antagonistic); see also ROBERT GILPIN, GLOBAL POLITICAL
ECONOMY: UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 43 (2011) (“[T]he
primary concern of states was to acquire a favorable balance of trade/payments to
finance their external military and political ambitions.”).
27
See John Linarelli, How Trade Law Changed: Why It Should Change Again, 65
MERCER L. REV. 621 (2004) (citing League of Nations report looking back at interwar trade system and reviewing prior history of short-lived commercial treaties
during the Industrial Revolution. For example, in the mid-18th century, trade
between France and Great Britain was stifled. An embargo was in place and only
smuggling was possible. The Anglo-French Commercial Treaty of 1786 liberalized
trade of French wines and silk and British textiles and manufactured products).
28 See Sol Picciotto, Networks in International Economic Integration: Fragmented
States and the Dilemmas of NeoLiberalism, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1014, 1022–23
(1997) (arguing that emerging trade regulation and industrialization policy in the
late 19th and early 20th centuries “reinforced national sovereignty, in the sense that
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In GEC 1.0, the foundational domestic law of each State (“State
Law”) was also designed to foster concentration of capital towards
industrialization and massive urbanization goals. States solidified
legal codes protecting contracts and property rights. They tolerated
periods of “boom-and-bust” with little in the way of a social safety
net. They did not feature an evolved system of protection of
workers’ economic security.29 The overall effect and purpose of
these policies was the solidification of an internal market within
each trading State, a project which partially explained (if not
justified) the relative paucity of regulation, welfare and
administrative control of the market for the purpose of helping
Labor.30 The nature of the Industrial Revolution was consistent
with, and shaped, the architecture of Statecraft. The economies of
the emerging Western liberal democracies shifted rapidly from an
agrarian model to an urban and manufacturing base. Railroads,
waterways, ocean, and other means of transportation of industrial
output required capital concentration and a large labor force.31 The
manufacturing concerns supported this infrastructure-creation
effort and began to organize into factory networks that launched the
era of production for gradually expanding consumer societies.32 The
seeds of a Middle Class,33 which today exceeds three billion people
the substance of regulation was generally left to national processes of
legitimation . . . .”).
29 See generally JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH (1954) (arguing
that the leading causes of the 1929 crash, high speculation and high optimism, are
intrinsic to America’s economic psychology). Galbraith lists income inequality and
wealth hoarding, poor or nonexistent leveraging in the banking system to prevent
loss of savings, and inflexibility in government regulation as contributors of the
economic crash. Id.
30
We are using the term “Labor” in the context of GEC 1.0 to capture in broad
fashion the working class that generally was employed in factories and other mass
production centers of manufactured goods. See generally BRIAN GREENBERG, THE
DAWNING OF AMERICAN LABOR: THE NEW REPUBLIC TO THE INDUSTRIAL AGE (2017)
(exploring the meaning of labor amid industrialization in post-civil war America).
31 See, e.g., SAMUEL P. HAYS, THE RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIALISM 1885–1914 22–23
(2d ed. 1995).
32 See generally TYLER STOVALL, TRANSNATIONAL FRANCE: THE MODERN HISTORY
OF A UNIVERSAL NATION (2015) (highlighting how modernization of Paris had
spurred consumerism and infrastructure investments).
33
Our use of the term “Middle Class” is relative to economic stratification in
each GEC iteration and to the States or groups of States (e.g., the Western victors of
World War II) at issue. We do not address broad sociological and political

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss2/1

2019]

Global Economic Constitutionalism

337

worldwide, were planted.34 The building effort was assisted by the
relatively laissez-faire policies of the State and its mercantilist
approach.35
The international order reflected the domestic architecture and
did not necessitate complex rules of trade.36 Instead, the GEC
essentially delinked markets so as to enable them to consolidate free
The constitutional order was
of international regulation.37
characterized by a mercantilist economic norm.38 Mercantilism was
an unambiguous corollary of a state-centric view of sovereignty, and
the economic norm for a power-based system of international
relations.39 States allocated their resources to industrialize and build
internal markets and industries, and GEC 1.0 created an
questions such as the relationship between economic status and political power.
Rather, we seek to broadly define the Middle Class as the economically similarly
situated segment of the population that finds itself between Labor and an upper
class. Oftentimes, as in our discussion of the Global Middle Class, see infra Section
4.1, the Middle Class will be defined in reference to income bracket. This is a
common way of identifying the Middle Class for the purposes of a particular study.
See, e.g., The American Middle Class is Losing Ground, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 9, 2015),
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/12/09/the-american-middle-class-islosing-ground/ [https://perma.cc/3BEH-848U] (defining middle class for
purposes of study as “adults whose annual household income is two-thirds to
double the national median, about $42,000 to $126,000 annually in 2014 dollars for
a household of three.”).
34 See generally JOHN HINSHAW & PETER N. STEARNS, INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE
MODERN WORLD: FROM THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION TO THE INTERNET 313 (2013).
35 See BLAUG, supra note 26, at 10–14 (recognizing a mercantilist approach as a
means to encourage investment through a favorable balance of trade without public
investments or monetary intervention).
36 See Picciotto, supra note 28, at 1023 (recognizing that the forms of
coordination respected and indeed reinforced national sovereignty by leaving the
substance of regulation to national processes of legitimation).
37 See id. at 1022–1031 (suggesting that many of the key institutions between
1865 and 1914 were developed through cross-border debate, emulation, and
coordination).
38 See GILPIN, supra note 26, at 196–197 (highlighting steadily growing trade
protection from latter decades of the 19th century up to and during the Great
Depression of the 1930s); Peter A. Gourevitch, International Trade, Domestic
Coalitions, and Liberty: Comparative Responses to the Crisis of 1873–1896, 8 J. INTERDISC.
HIST. 281, 289 (1977) (suggesting that rising tariffs during late 19th century may be
driven by political explanations that favor protectionist forces at the expense of free
traders).
39 See generally ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER: AMERICA AND EUROPE
IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
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international system with relatively few cooperative frameworks,
and no multilateral International Institutions of the type that arose
in GEC 2.0.40 The colonialist policies of Europe and, to a much lesser
extent, the United States, complemented economic protectionism
and the understanding of trade as a form of war served to solidify
the homeland. The “periphery” was viewed as a competitive field
from which to draw resources.41 As the major European States
carved out Africa, Asia, and South America, they played another
zero-sum game where their relative power defined the outcome.42
Each GEC contains the seeds of its own demise and, over time,
GEC 1.0 fueled and fostered a constitutional architecture that made
it unwise to continue to operate the international economic order as
a Union of Delinked States with common policies allowing their
internal markets to solidify free of interventionist policies.43 GEC 1.0
resulted in the creation of relatively well-defined nations, and the
consolidation of an internal market delineated by national
boundaries. By 1918 and the adoption of the Treaty of Versailles,
the GEC 1.0 State-Nation had morphed into a collective of nationstates that formed the League of Nations and launched a new era of
international collaboration.44 Internally, those States witnessed the
rise of a new Middle Class, with a large Labor component as the
40 See Picciotto, supra note 28, at 1029–32 (illustrating how the voluntarism that
followed from state sovereignty made it hard to achieve agreement on a multilateral
arrangement of any substance).
41 See Fazlollah Bonakdar Shirazi, An Empirical Assessment of the CenterPeriphery Hypothesis in International Economic Relations (1988) (unpublished
Ph.D.
dissertation,
Portland
State
University),
http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2205&context=op
en_access_etds [https://perma.cc/P3TG-YJH4] (emphasizing the role played by
periphery countries as object of exploitation by center countries by producing
primary and agricultural products).
42 See BLAUG, supra note 26, at 10–14 (recounting theories defending
mercantilism as appropriate in promoting national autarchy and expansion of state
power).
43 See Picciotto, supra note 28, at 1032–38 (highlighting the obvious need to
strengthen the international system when it came to planning the foundation for
the post-war global order).
44
The Treaty of Versailles itself contained many economic legal provisions
that set forth principles that advanced the global economic regime in the following
decades. See BEATRIZ HUARTE MELGAR, THE TRANSIT OF GOODS IN PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2015) (citing Steve Charnovitz, What is International Economic
Law, 14 J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 9 (2011)).
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backbone of industrialized manufacturing. This Middle Class
coalesced into the principal interlocutor of the State, and the ethos
of Statecraft shifted from market consolidation to ensuring the
welfare of the Middle Class.45 Given that transformational shift, the
delinked, State-centric nature of GEC 1.0 was no longer consistent
with the ethos of the evolved Statecraft.
In the next Section, we discuss the transition from GEC 1.0 to
GEC 2.0, and the principal features of the constitutional order that
arose after World War II.
3.2. GEC 2.0: The Rise of the Western Middle Class and the
Administrative State.
A common trope of trade history holds that the modern liberal
democracies erred when they adhered to mercantilism in the first
place, and that they corrected this historical mistake when they
moved toward liberalized trade after World War II.46 The corollary
of this account is that comparative advantage, the economic basis for
liberalized trade, is a timeless truth that should always inform
economic and trade policy.47 That is the essence of the “positive
evolutionary account” of trade history that we referenced in the
introduction. We disagree. Until the conditions for comparative
advantage were ripe, including in particular the consolidation of a
Middle Class-backed internal market coextensive with national
borders, States were simply not ready to transition to GEC 2.0. The
tragedy of the post-World War I period is not that States failed to
correct a historical mistake, but that they did not recognize in time
that by 1918 the GEC had evolved and that its foundational
principles required adjustment. There is nothing timeless about
comparative advantage any more than there was anything timeless
about GEC 1.0. Comparative advantage is simply an economic
ethos, appropriate for a specific set of market circumstances and
market actors in a discrete historical time period. In fact, the modern
liberal democracies were late in recognizing the need to overhaul
45 See MARK WALSH, PAUL STEPHENS & STEPHEN MOORE, SOCIAL POLICY AND
WELFARE 28–50 (2000) (detailing how social policy through the 20th century in the
United Kingdom developed to emphasize social welfare).
46 See GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS 182–83 (8th ed. 2018)
(providing an anecdote demonstrating the benefits of liberalized trade). For a
detailed history, see generally IRWIN, supra note 19, at 276–508.
47 See id. at 183.
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the system because they suffered from the same reflex of familiarity
that reinforces the belief that comparative advantage is timeless.
As we explained above, the GEC reflects the integration of an
economic ethos with a set of institutions, patterns of inter-state
relations, and legal regimes that are more or less all of a piece. The
economic ethos of GEC 2.0—liberalized trade through comparative
advantage—was an unequivocal rejection of mercantilism. It was
not enough, however, for the founders of GEC 2.0 to reject
protectionist policy from the standpoint of economics. As a
condition to acceptance of the system by the founding Western
liberal democracies, the GEC 2.0 framers also had to craft a legal
regime that would not interfere with the sovereign regulatory power
of the Administrative Nation-State.48 The International Institutions,
and their relationship to the domestic State, had to be such so as not
to impose redistributive choices on the Contracting Parties. Tariffs
would go down. Taxation and regulation would not be allowed to
discriminate against foreign goods, but at least in theory
international law would allow the Contracting Parties complete
freedom to redistribute the expanded global pool of assets, based on
unimpeded domestic choices. This was the Bretton Woods
compromise, which we describe in salient parts below. This
institutional arrangement, which was at the heart of GEC 2.0, led to
40 years of growth and general constitutional balance in trade and
Statecraft.
GEC 2.0 was built from the bottom up, starting with the
transformed nature of State Law. The competing ideologies of
Statecraft after World War I sought to capture the support of the
newly-coalesced Middle Class. Their legitimacy came to depend on
that wide base, rather than the narrower coalition of Capital and
ruling classes that drove GEC 1.0. The 20th century modern liberal
democratic model offered to a wide segment of the Middle Class a
system of economic security and potential upward mobility
revolving around a powerful Administrative State. Extending
economic opportunities such as those widely available to the Middle

48 See Steven Bernstein & Erin Hannah, Non-State Global Standard Setting and
the WTO: Legitimacy and the Need for Regulatory Space, 11 J. INT’L ECON. L. 575 (2008)
(discussing the need for the WTO to refrain from social and environmental standard
setting).
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Class in the 20th century was revolutionary.49 The preceding
economic orders granted this level of wealth only to an exceedingly
small segment of society.50
To accomplish this goal, for the modern liberal democracies,
State Law in the age of GEC 2.0 focused on the delivery of welfare
to the Middle Class via a massive bureaucracy comprising the
Administrative State. Welfare included a social safety net and tools
for equalizing opportunities (unemployment, disability, health care,
education, etc.).51 Governments utilized Keynesian and other
interventionist policies to regulate economic cycles and mitigate
boom-and-bust swings.
They adopted economic and social
measures of general applicability intended to protect the Middle
Class. Those included investor and consumer protection, health and
occupational safety, and environmental conservation, in addition to
a wide and sophisticated social safety net.52 Each major State
followed a road to welfare that, while using different means (e.g.,

See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, supra note 23 at 144-45.
See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 350–64 (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., 2014) (arguing that wealth is often accumulated in capitalistic
societies by whole classes of people that can bring generational defects; when r (rate
of return on capital) is greater than g (rate of economic growth), wealth becomes
accumulated overtime, leading to inequality and social distress); id. at 479–87
(calling for interventionist policies to address the accumulation of wealth and the
associated social issues).
51 See PETER FLORA & ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMNER, DEVELOPMENT OF WELFARE
STATES IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 22–28 (1981) (providing an overview of the
development and goals of the welfare states generally and their specific iterations
in various European and North American countries).
52 See Sar A. Levitan, How the Welfare System Promotes Economic Security, 100
POL. SCI. Q. 447 (1985) (positing that social welfare was established in two principal
waves, the New Deal and the 1960s and 1970s, and evolved into an increasingly
more expansive and sophisticated safety net encompassing retired, unemployed,
disabled, and other groups of people who fell off the wide employment-based selfsupport structure). Our definition of welfare, as will be seen below, is much
broader. We reference a complex network of evolving relationships, including
between government, capital, labor, the middle class, and international institutions;
as well as a set of norms and social structures that govern those relationships, which
evolve and, at any particular stage of social history, determine the economic
security and opportunity of various societal groups.
49
50
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indicative planning or tax-and-spend), was designed to provide the
nation with a minimum level of economic security.53
GEC 2.0 has aptly been described as the “corporate welfare
state.”54 Policymakers grounded the delivery of welfare in a stable
base of corporations with large balance sheets and payrolls, whose
mission was to supply career jobs to the Middle Class as much as to
generate profits for Capital. After World War II, Capital joined with
the State to establish “full employment” as the foundational goal for
the American economy.
The Roosevelt Administration had
convened the Committee for Economic Development (CED) during
the War.55 It was comprised of a group of large corporation
executives who were dedicated to structuring their activities so as to
give employment to the 58 million war workers.56 Its platform

53 See GØSTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM
26–33 (1990) (describing three distinct welfare-state regimes and their political
economies).
54 See STEVEN MAY ET AL., THE DEBATE OVER CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
4–6 (2007) (recounting the historical development of corporate social responsibility
and industrial welfare programs).
55 See Marc Linder, Eisenhower-Era Marxist-Confiscatory Taxation: Requiem for
the Rhetoric of Rate Reduction for the Rich, 70 TUL. L. REV. 905, 933 (1996) (“[T]he
Committee for Economic Development (CED) . . . prescrib[ed] a long-range
program of reduction in the highest individual income tax rates as a priority in
order to restore incentives . . . .”); COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
FEDERAL TAX ISSUES IN 1955 6–7 (1955) (reviewing the priorities for tax reduction of
the Roosevelt Administration); Report Urges April 1 Tax Drop if Spending is Cut By 5
Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1954 (reporting on suggested tax rate reductions against
projected cuts in government spending in 1954). For the composition of the CED
and an account of its ultimate merger with the Conference Board in 2015, see The
Conference Board to Merge with the Committee for Economic Development: Venerable
Organizations with Complementary Missions Join Forces, CISION PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 14,
2015),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/the-conference-board-tomerge-with-the-committee-for-economic-development-300020593.html
[https://perma.cc/RFB6-HWCT] (noting that since 1942 the members of the CED
have been the country’s top business executives as well as policy experts).
56 See generally JERRY DAVIS, BROOKINGS, CAPITAL MARKETS AND JOB CREATION
IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Dec. 30, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/07/capital_markets.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7SN-4MK3]
[hereinafter DAVIS, CAPITAL MARKETS] (detailing the stability of the large American
corporations during the Great Depression and WWII eras and the rise of capital
markets and corporate employment).
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became the animating principle of economic policy after World War
II, through a continued public-private partnership.57
With this welfare structure in place, the State could focus on the
regulation of its interlocutors: the corporations that succeeded GEC
1.0 Capital as drivers of growth and continued industrialization.
Whereas the previous economic order allowed Capital to privilege
growth free of structural obligations towards Labor,58 the new order
assigned to its corporations the responsibility for first-line delivery
of the welfare basket to its Labor force, including, for instance,
healthcare, retirement, and savings plans. The State leaned on the
corporation to respect minimum welfare standards, including
conditions of employment. It regulated the commons to limit
market failures, externalities, and other harms to the socio-economic
expectations of the Middle Class.59 And it could legislate protection
for those who fell out of the corporate welfare net, employing
programs of general applicability such as unemployment, disability
benefits, and of course retirement benefits.
The Bretton Woods treaties of international trade that
dominated GEC 2.0 crafted norms protective of the States’ ability to
administer and deliver welfare while expanding their collective
resources through free trade (Embedded Liberalism).60
57 See Robert M. Collins, Positive Business Responses to the New Deal: The Roots
of the Committee for Economic Development 1933–1942, 52 BUS. HIST. REV. 369 (1978)
(explaining how the New Deal laid the groundwork for public-private partnership
and commitment to full employment, and despite occasional contentious relations
between America’s corporate leaders and the Administration during the 1930s and
1940s, influential groups like the Business Advisory Council led the drive to join
the private sector and government in a joint effort to ensure full employment).
58 See generally DAVID FAIRRIS, SHOPFLOOR MATTERS: LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS IN TWENTIETH CENTURY MANUFACTURING 12–13 (2016) (discussing the
evolving relationship between labor and management in the decades preceding and
following World War II).
59 See Gerald F. Davis et al., The Decline and Fall of the Conglomerate Firm in the
1980s: The Deinstitutionalization of an Organizational Form, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 547 (1994)
(reviewing corporate history and describing the rise of the American corporation
as an institution that provided welfare benefits such as healthcare, retirement, and
savings plans in the twentieth century; these large corporations were the result of
careful acquisitions and conglomeratization; the “firm-as-portfolio” model meant
multiple smaller firms could be acquired—even if their businesses were
unrelated—and a wide net of people could be employed by one corporation).
60 See John Gerard Ruggie, Embedded Liberalism Revisited: Institutions and
Progress in International Economic Relations, in PROGRESS IN POSTWAR INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 203 (Emanuel Adler & Beverly Crawford eds., 1991) (defining embedded
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Comparative advantage as an economic principle joined with a legal
system protective of regulatory autonomy to replace the
mercantilist/protectionist model. As Keynes put it, the lawyers
were the “poets of trade” in that they invented norms and
institutions that would at once liberalize the movement of goods
across borders and shelter national welfare. This replaced the
institutions-free, zero-sum game of GEC 1.0. The Middle Class, as
the principal interlocutor and protected subject of the State law, was
sheltered from the international institutions by a system that
essentially allowed the State to veto conflicting norms of
international law when it deemed its middle class to be threatened.61
Additionally, and in the same spirit, while the treaties
established International Institutions to manage and regulate trade,
the regime was minimally intrusive on national sovereign
regulatory space.
The GATT was firmly grounded in the
international legal tradition of highly limited, State-to-State
enforcement. Unlike the European system, it gave each Contracting
Party ample discretion to “selectively exit” the norms of the system.
For example, the “positive consensus rule” required that all
Contracting Parties approve a judicial determination that a violation
had occurred before the applicable GATT Panel decision could
become binding.62 States also routinely made rational choices,
liberalism as a construct where “international economic order would be
multilateral in character” but with this multinationalism “predicated upon
domestic interventionism”). See generally DANI RODRIK, The Political Trilemma of the
World Economy, in THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF
THE WORLD ECONOMY 187–207 (2011) (presenting the possibility of leveraging wellcrafted rules of globalization to enhance the operation of national democracies).
61 See generally PATTERSON & AFILALO, supra note 20, at 74 (stating that states
“chose the framework underlying the GATT because it allowed them to maintain
their domestic architecture as they entered into an international framework that
expanded the global economic pie. The main players’ commitment to an
interventionist welfare state ensured that the economic project would be married
to a political redistributive enterprise . . . . Democracy vanquished communism not
(only) on the battlefield, but in managing to raise standards of living and
establishing a welfare system that integrated into the national economic whole the
working classes that were the target of communism’s ideological war.” (citations
omitted)).
62 See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT
SYSTEM,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c2s1p1
_e.htm [https://perma.cc/3B54-3CY9] (“The rudimentary rules in Article
XXIII:2 of GATT 1947 provided that the contracting parties themselves, acting
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mindful of their own violations, to carefully determine which
regulations to challenge and which to let stand.
The foundational trade norms were also designed to shelter the
national regulatory space. The GATT, and later the WTO,
accomplished the work of trade liberalization through decades of
tariff reduction,63 challenges to non-tariff barriers to trade ranging
from quota-like licensing requirements to environmental and health
measures adversely impacting foreign products,64 and other gradual
jointly, had to deal with any dispute between individual contracting parties.
Accordingly, disputes in the very early years of GATT 1947 were decided by rulings
of the Chairman of the GATT Council. Later, they were referred to working parties
composed of representatives from all interested contracting parties, including the
parties to the dispute. These working parties adopted their reports by consensus
decisions.”).
63
See infra text and data accompanying footnotes 70 through 73, which
illustrate the dramatic cuts in tariffs that have gradually occurred after barriers to
trade peaked in the 1930s, as well as the correlation between tariff cuts and
economic growth. Those numbers reflect the fundamental change in the basic
animating principles of the international trade order, from protectionism to
comparative advantage-based trading. See also Robert E. Baldwin, The Changing
Nature of U.S. Trade Policy Since World War II, in THE STRUCTURE AND EVOLUTION OF
RECENT U.S. TRADE POLICY 5 (Robert E. Baldwin & Anne O. Krueger eds., 1984)
(discussing the trend of tariff reduction in the post World War II period).
64
There are a number of fiscal and custom measures affecting the import of
foreign cigarettes into Thailand. These include customs valuations practices, health
taxes, and retail licensing requirements. In 2008, the Philippines requested
consultation with Thailand claiming these measures were administered in an
unreasonable manner and that the domestic versus foreign licensing requirements
were a violation. See Panel Report, Thailand–Customs and Fiscal Measures on
Cigarettes from the Philippines, WTO Doc. WT/DS371/24 (adopted June 1, 2018). The
United States had a ban on shrimp and shrimp products from countries that did not
have measures in place to prevent the capture of sea turtles, also known as Section
609 of the Public Law 101–162. In 1996, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand
requested consultations with the United States claiming this ban was a violation of
Articles I, XI, and XIII of the GATT 1994. The United States eventually conceded to
the Article XI claim by not putting forward a defending argument. See Appellate
Body Report and Panel Report pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU, United States—
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/23
(Nov. 26, 2001). In 2009 the United States passed the Family Smoking Prevention
Tobacco Control Act which bans clove cigarettes in its Section 907. Indonesia
requested a consultation with the United States in 2010 claiming that this Section
violated Article III of the GATT 1994. The Appellate Body of the case found that
the architecture, implementation, and operation of this Section had a detrimental
effect on the clove cigarettes from Indonesia. See Notification of a Mutually Agreed
Solution, United States—Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes,
WTO Doc. WT/DS406/17 (Oct. 9, 2014).
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liberalizations of cross-border commerce.65
The principal
constitutional norms effectuating comparative advantage were tariff
reduction with most-favored nation treatment to all Contracting
Parties, anti-discrimination (“national treatment”), the ban on
measures having an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction,
and the resulting “tariffication” of obstacles to trade into transparent
taxes at the border that was effectuated (with respect to goods) by
the national treatment and no-quota basic norms.66 This construct
was intended to relegate all non-tariff barriers to trade transparent
tariffs, which themselves were subject to successive rounds of
negotiation. GEC 2.0, then, was designed to enable global growth
while leaving the States free to maintain redistributive policies of
their choice.
Parallel to the global integrationist project, regional economic
communities began to integrate into trading blocs.67 In those blocs,
regional political objectives customarily worked hand-in-hand with
economic objectives.68 The European Communities, and later the
European Union, sought to end the catastrophic wars of European
enmity, in particular those between France and Germany.69 The
65 See, e.g., Understanding the WTO: Basics–The Uruguay Round, WORLD TRADE
ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/Q9JK-K4XM] (last visited Feb. 2, 2018) (recounting substantial
progress achieved in the Uruguay Round); Understanding the WTO: The
Agreements—Tariffs: More Bindings and Closer to Zero, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm2_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/T5UJ-CFJ9] (last visited Feb. 2, 2018) (highlighting countries
commitments to cut and “bind” their customs duty rates on imports of goods).
66 See, e.g., Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Bilateral Opportunism and the Rules of GATT/WTO, 67 J. INT’L ECON. 268 (2004)
(highlighting the central role played by non-discrimination (MFN) and reciprocity
in preserving “the welfare of non-participating government and therefore offer[ing]
a first line of defense against bilateral opportunism.”).
67 See Gordon M. Gough & Sivakumar Venkataramany, Regional Economic
Cooperation, 5 INT’L BUS. & ECON. RES. J. 49, 52–53 (2006) (examining the most
influential regional trading blocs: EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, and ASEAN).
68 See generally APARAJITA ENDOW, FRANCE, GERMANY AND THE EUROPEAN
UNION: MAASTRICT AND AFTER 1–3 (2003); ROBERT KAGAN, supra note 39.
69 See generally Robert Schuman, The Schuman Declaration (May 9, 1950),
available
at
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/europeday/schuman-declaration_en [https://perma.cc/6BEL-L2D9] (declaring that the
pooling of coal and steel production—with equal access and identical terms
available to France and Germany—would make war between the traditional
enemies not only “unthinkable” but also “materially impossible.”).
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North American Free Trade Agreement aimed at providing Mexican
laborers with domestic opportunity motivated, in part, to stem the
flow of illegal immigration into the United States.70 The political
goals of the system defined the extent to which constituent States
retained their sovereignty; for example, more in North America than
in Europe. In all instances, however, sovereignty occupied a central
role in the design of the international regime.
The tariff reduction work of the GATT was extremely successful.
Witness the drop in the average tariff on United States imports that
took place during GEC 2.0 as compared to GEC 1.0:

The growth function of liberalized trade for national economies
was also achieved. States experienced greater growth after cutting
their own tariffs and meaningfully participating in the globalized
markets. The figures below, showing the drastically improved
growth rates of four States in the years following their undertaking
massive tariff reduction, are representative of the generally positive
impact of liberalized trade on the growth of the States practicing it:

70
Louis Uchitelle, Nafta Should Have Stopped Illegal Immigration, Right?, N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
18,
2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/18/weekinreview/18uchitelle.html
[https://perma.cc/ECF4-FT5N] (NAFTA “held out an alluring promise: the
agreement would reduce illegal immigration from Mexico.”); see also SUBHRENDU
BHATTCHARYA, GLOBALIZATION AND A SHRUNKEN WORLD 130 (2008).
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By 1990, and the fall of the Berlin Wall, it was widely accepted
that trade was a core component of the Western liberal democratic
system that prevailed over Fascism and Communism. Democracies
could effectively redistribute resources and protect their most
vulnerable. The trade system was successfully structured to enable
the Administrative State to accomplish that goal.
Nevertheless, we posit that after 1990, the global markets and
market actors entered into an age of “high-gear globalized
integration,” which drastically changed the nature of the GEC 2.0
globalized markets, and gradually made it essential to begin a
transition from GEC 2.0 to GEC 3.0.71 This phenomenon had several
manifestations which included, but also went well beyond, the
integration of markets:
(i) A shift of economic power from the virtually exclusive
province of the Western liberal democracies that founded the GATT
towards emerging economies, and the correlated gradual erosion of
the Western Middle Class;
(ii) The expansion of trade to new areas of commerce, in
particular services, and the rise of a sophisticated network of
investment treaties that, together with the information technology
revolution, enabled capital to follow rapidly into new opportunities
in the globalized markets;

71
For a detailed account of the role of information technology in this process,
see generally RICHARD BALDWIN, THE GREAT CONVERGENCE (2016).
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(iii) The rise in the West of a large class, which we call the
Chronically Excluded, that lost the ability to compete in the
globalized economy, and the concurrent rise of a Middle Class
located in the emerging economies that were not taken into account
when the GEC 2.0 constitution was created;
(iv) Growing lack of effectiveness of the GEC 2.0 welfare system
and Administrative State, in the face of the changed market
conditions;
(v) Resulting failure of the international trade order, which
relies on effective national economic policies to address the
inequalities created by the globalization of markets;
(vi) Changes in the nature of work, and in the make-up of the
corporate base for the administration of welfare;
(vii) Technological breakthroughs that create uncertainty as to
the nature of the skills needed to compete for future jobs.
In the next Part of this Article, we explore the transformational
shifts and explain why they mark the dawn of a new GEC and make
it necessary to overhaul GEC 2.0.
4. HIGH-GEAR GLOBALIZED INTEGRATION AND THE RISE OF GEC 3.0
4.1. Rise of the Global Middle Class: America’s Chronically Excluded.
GEC 2.0 initially was an enterprise launched by and for Western
liberal democracies that, although by different means and priorities,
generally pursued similar objectives through their respective
version of the Administrative State. The entry of emerging
economies into the global market resulted in the natural course of
the Bretton Woods enablement of global commerce in the rise of a
new and vast global supply chain. For the first time in literally
hundreds of years, the locus of economic power started to shift back
from the West to the Far East. We will analyze the impact of this
and other transformative patterns from a U.S.-centric standpoint.
The shift in economic power generated a massive transfer of
employment opportunities from the United States to the emerging
economies. The first wave of “tradable” American jobs was
principally in the manufacturing sector. In 1970, the highest global
exporters of goods—measured by aggregate value added for
exports—were: the United States at $290 billion, Asia, including
China, at $155 billion and Europe, at $140 billion. China itself only
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reported $34 billion annually. The trend began to change in the mid1990s when East Asia experienced a major upswing in
manufacturing. By 2015, the global total value Asia added in the
manufacturing sector was worth $759 trillion, with $377 trillion
allocated to China alone. The United States and Europe were at $282
trillion and $147 trillion, respectively.
The gradual transformation of national markets into an
integrated global market resulted in the rise of what we call the
“Global Middle Class,” a central feature of GEC 3.0. The correlative
outcome, on the domestic level, was the erosion of the welfare and
economic security of the national Middle Class of the modern liberal
democracies that created and was the base of the Bretton Woods
system.72 Consider the following figures:73 In 1950, the worldwide
Middle Class numbered approximately 250 million people, most of
whom were located in Western Europe, the United States, and
Japan. In 1985, approximately 150 years after the start of the
Industrial Revolution, the Global Middle Class had reached 1 billion
people. By the end of 2016, the Global Middle Class—defined as
households of four earning from $14,600 to $146,000—numbered 3.2
billion. 140 million people join the Global Middle Class annually,
and the figure is expected to reach 170 million in five years.
The overwhelming majority of the new members joining the
Global Middle Class annually—by one count as many as 88%—is
based in Asia. The Middle Class in the liberal democracies that won
the War, prominently including the United States, is stagnant or
slow-growing at best. Significantly, the “most dynamic segment of
the global middle-class market is at the lower end of the scale,
among new entrants with comparatively low per capita spending.”74
72 See Nouriel Roubini, The Political Left and Right Are Being Upended by
Globalization Politics, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 23, 2016, 10:12 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nouriel-roubini/globalizationpolitics_b_11655494.html [https://perma.cc/S5H4-VY7L] (illustrating how losers
of globalization increasingly find champions of anti-globalization to challenge
mainstream orthodoxies of left and right politics).
73 See June Zaccone, Has Globalization Destroyed the American Middle Class?
2–6
(June
2012)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://njfac.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/07/GloblMClass.pdf [https://perma.cc/HFR9-ANUU].
74
Homi Kharas, The Unprecedented Expansion of the Global Middle Class: An
Update, (Brookings Global Econ. & Dev., Working Paper No. 100, 2017), 2,
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/02/global_20170228_global-middle-class.pdf
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In the rest of the world, primarily in the jurisdictions that joined the
global markets in the wake of their liberalization, it is fast growing.75
At the same time, as we will explain in greater detail below, the
Middle Class of the founding States of the GATT, like the United
States, split into distinct sub-classes:
(i) Capital, made up of entrepreneurs, investors, and other
holders of equity in the transformed companies driving the
economy and more traditional industries, together with their top
executives. This Capital class amassed a disproportionately higher
amount of resources than it had in GEC 2.0;
(ii) a mid-level and upper Middle Class, usually urban-based,
for whom economic security and social mobility remained at levels
above the average of the global Middle Class; and
(iii) a new and growing Class, which we will call the Chronically
Excluded, that is significantly worse off than it was in GEC 2.0 and
is in decline rather than aspiring toward upward mobility.
The Chronically Excluded comprise the stagnant Middle Class
of the United States, as well as other modern liberal democracies,
and the base of economic populism.76 The emergence of the
[https://perma.cc/TH8B-J9VM] (noting that, by his calculation, the growth of the
Middle Class includes 88% of new entrants from Asia, and that such growth is due
to both rising populations and incomes).
75 See id. at 10–13. For economic models anticipating this as a result of free
trade, see Emily Blanchard & Gerald Willmann, Trade, Education, and the Shrinking
Middle Class, 99 J. Iɴᴛ’ʟ Eᴄᴏɴ. 263 (2016); Ferdinando Monte, Skill Bias, Trade, and
Wage Dispersion, 83 J. Iɴᴛ’ʟ Eᴄᴏɴ. 202 (2011). Those models note that globalization
affects developing and developed countries in different ways. When countries that
are already developed experience globalization, growth is disproportionately
allocated to the segments of the population that tend to be better educated and work
in export-orientated fields. When countries that are still developing experience
globalization, on the other hand, there is an increased demand for unskilled
workers and the production of goods that necessitate less skilled labor input.
76
Policymakers in Western liberal democracies have been slow to recognize
the relationship between populist movements and the condition of the Chronically
Excluded. In his December 10, 2018 address responding to the unprecedented
social unrest caused by the “yellow jackets” protest, France’s President Emmanuel
Macron acknowledged that the crisis pertains to “persons in a situation of handicap,
whose place in society is not sufficiently recognized.” “Their distress does not date
from yesterday,” he added, “but we cowardly wound up getting used to it, and at
bottom, everything happened as if they were forgotten, erased.” Verbatim: Le
discours d’Emmanuel Macron face aux «gilets jaunes», LE MONDE (Dec. 10, 2018),
https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2018/12/10/le-verbatim-de-lallocution-televisee-du-president-de-la-republique_5395523_823448.html
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Chronically Excluded is a crucial component of our story. We
distinguish them from the rest of the Middle Class for the following
reasons: neither the State nor the International Institutions, which
are for the most part still following the GEC 2.0 model, are designed
to foster their economic and social security.77 The welfare system in
countries like the United States was built for GEC 2.0, when the State
relied on a corporate base of employers that no longer exists or has
been substantially eroded.78 Even if the income of the Chronically
Excluded is comparable to that of the lower rungs of the rising
Middle Class in emerging economies, the Chronically Excluded are
not similarly situated because their prospects for upward mobility
and meaningful, secure employment are dimmed by the relocation
of industries that are natural outlets for their skills. In emerging
markets, on the other hand, this trend is reversed and the lower rung
of the Middle Class has access to opportunities for upward mobility
relative to its current economic status.
In the Sections that follow, as we review the other transformative
changes that are marking the dawn of GEC 3.0, we will discuss
further how they impact the Chronically Excluded. At the outset,
however, we need to address the claim that full employment in the
American economy as of this writing negates the argument that
international trade, coupled with the other transformative patterns
that we have identified, has created a Chronically Excluded class. In
other words, is there really a socio-economic problem, or are we
perhaps dealing with other causes for disenchantment, such as
immigration, cultural warfare, or another less tangible cause? Our
first response is based on current data. While unemployment is at
an historic low, wages have stagnated in the United States. The
economic turnaround since the Great Recession has seen a decrease
in the quality of jobs available in the labor market. While
employment has gone back up, the wages prevailing in the
marketplace have failed to keep pace. Workers are often employed
in jobs that do not match their previous skill set, which they had
[https://perma.cc/CJE5-FFSD] (“C’est celle des plus fragiles, des personnes en
situation de handicap dont la place dans la société n’est pas encore assez reconnue.
Leur détresse ne date pas d’hier mais nous avions fini lâchement par nous y
habituer et au fond, tout se passait comme s’ils étaient oubliés, effacés.”).
77 See Zaccone, supra note 73, at 11–13, 16 (explaining how globalization is
causing the splintering of the middle class and institutions lag behind social and
economic reality).
78 See DAVIS, CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 56, at 3–4 (describing the
transformation of the corporate sector from diversified conglomerates into smaller,
more industrially focused firms).
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used in tradable jobs. To illustrate the decrease in wage levels,
consider the chart below, which shows the total compensation share
of GDP being on an overall declining curve, from 1970 to 2016:

Second, employment data does not include the workers who
have completely dropped out of the labor market, or who are
marginally attached to one or more tenuous jobs. People who had
reliable, consistent employment fell out of the labor force, or
switched to part-time, low paid, or home care work.79 Regional
disparities are also stark.80 The Chronically Excluded tend to be
located in former manufacturing regions, and overall data can
obscure the numbers that accurately measure their conditions.
When the data is analyzed not only per State rather than nationally,
but county by county within States, the lack of upward mobility and

79 See Megan Dunn, Steven E. Haugen, and Janie-Lynn Kang, The Current
Population Survey—Tracking Unemployment in the United States for Over 75 Years,
MONTHLY LAB. REV. (Jan. 2018), https://doi.org/10.21916/mlr.2018.4
[https://perma.cc/3W4A-VQU8] (“Although the number of people unemployed
and the unemployment rate had dropped below levels experienced before the
recession . . . [m]ore than 8 years after the end of the recession, about one-quarter
of the unemployed were looking for work for 6 months or longer, still high by
historical standards, and about 5 million people who wanted full-time work had to
settle for part-time work. This, coupled with a prolonged period of low labor force
participation rates, resulted in continued interest in alternative measures of labor
underutilization, since the broader measures were associated with larger groups of
people experiencing labor market difficulties.”).
80 See generally ENRICO MORETTI, THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF JOBS (2012)
(highlighting that communities like Menlo Park and Visalia, even though they are
geographically close, could not be more different in terms of job prospects,
education, and wealth).
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meaningful employment faced by the Chronically Excluded
becomes undeniable.81
Our next claim involves a prediction for the future, grounded in
the current patterns that we have identified. In the following
Sections, we will explain our rationale for predicting that the
Chronically Excluded will face an ever-narrowing spectrum of
opportunities. The trends in the evolution of the globalized
marketplace leave them increasingly vulnerable to economic
insecurity and inability to compete. Further, the number of
Chronically Excluded is bound to expand drastically, because of the
current structural inability of the system to address the changes
associated with the rise of GEC 3.0. Whether it be tradability of retail
and other services jobs to which the Chronically Excluded have
flocked, technological advances that require skills to which the
Chronically Excluded do not have access, or regional paralysis, the
trend is not in favor of a rebound unless appropriate policy changes
are made. Another recession would also have a devastating effect
on the Chronically Excluded and those who will join their ranks,
absent a panoply of government tools ready to be deployed.
4.2. Regional Conglomeration vs. Regional Decline
The geopolitical map of the international trade system on which
GEC 2.0 was predicated distinguished among Nation-States. The
81 See, e.g., Brian Thiede and Shannon Monnat, The Great Recession and
America’s Geography of Unemployment, 35 DEMOGRAPHIC RES. 891, 907, 916–917
(2016). Thiede and Monnat posit that researching county unemployment is a more
insightful way of understanding joblessness in the United States. While betweenstate unemployment rates have declined since the recession of 2008, betweencounty unemployment has risen.
There are also higher than average
unemployment rates in different sectors of the economy—especially highly cyclical
sectors. The recession’s impact on county-level unemployment rates, for example,
were found to be above the national average (7.90% to 20.95% +) in county clusters
in the deep South, the Ohio River Valley, and the Southwest. See U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR,
BUREAU
OF
LABOR
STAT.,
NEWS
RELEASE
https://www.bls.gov/regions/midwest/newsrelease/countyemploymentandwages_indiana.htm
[https://perma.cc/5CVW2LBM] (finding that in pocketed areas across the United States, wage growth has
slowed; for example, in the State of Indiana, the study found that average weekly
wages approximated the national average in only 7 out of 102 counties).
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boundaries of the decolonized States of the second half of the 20th
century were often co-extensive with the less privileged economic
zones. Those States were described successively as “less developed
countries,” “developing countries,” and as they began to compete
meaningfully in the global markets, “emerging economies.”82
Today, the more accurate map of the globalized markets would
focus on regions, industries, and economic sub-groups within
States. Emerging economies are fueled by regional manufacturing
powerhouses that have secured large shares of the global supply
chain. In the United States, the opposite trend obtains. Declining
regions within the United States are home to the Chronically
Excluded. Especially in the lower-skilled sectors, entrants to the
Global Middle Class from emerging economies are gradually
conquering the markets. The upshot is that, in the emerging East,
powerful economic zones drive growth, whereas in the United
States and other Western liberal democracies, declining regions that
have lost manufacturing bases to the globalized markets lead the
decline.
A common myth about trade is that the principal comparative
advantage that allowed countries like China to become
manufacturing powerhouses is a low-wage base of workers. While
labor is obviously an important component of the cost of goods,
carefully-crafted State policies and programs also have driven
growth to a substantial extent.
Policies enabling regional
In emerging
conglomeration illustrate this proposition.83
economies, regional conglomeration was the result of exportoriented and indicative policies that created integrated economic
82 See generally Nicholas Lamp, The “Development” Discourse in Multilateral
Trade Lawmaking, 16 WORLD TRADE REV. 475, 487 (2017). The international trade
system relied heavily on these distinctions to establish different countries’ ability to
commit and comply with the international liberal market regime at various stages
of their development. This “temporal othering” allowed different sets of standards
to be used for purposes of developmental economics and its legal expression. For
example, less-developed countries would, ideally, benefit from policies that
increase their population’s ability to purchase goods from the global economy.
83 See generally ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Investment Report 2016: Foreign
Direct Investment and MSME Linkages, http://asean.org/storage/2016/09/ASEANInvestment-Report-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7XD-WBF9] (last visited Nov. 2,
2018) (arguing that regional production networks are the backbone of Asian
manufacturing base and likely to provide the basis for a future $2.5TN single
market of over 600 million people).
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zones designed to respond to identified needs of the global markets.
Those policies enabled the growth of industry by subsidizing and
enabling the establishment of industry concentrations.84 For
example, China’s “Foxconn cities” are conglomerates built as a
concentrated, massive network of factory and support services to
manufacture Apple’s (and other large companies’) electronic goods,
by Foxconn Technology Group, a Taiwanese multinational
electronics company. Foxconn cities established their own eCMMS
business model of e-enabled components, modules, moves, and
services—a vertically integrated one-stop shop that is considered
one of the shortest supply chains globally:85

This all-inclusive manufacturing model, enabled by years of
official export-promoting policies, has made Foxconn extremely
desirable as a contract manufacturer for companies like Apple,
Nintendo, and Motorola.86 These “one-stop shop” supply chains

84 See DANI RODRIK, STRAIGHT TALK ON TRADE: IDEAS FOR A SANE ECONOMY 186–
87 (2017).
85 See Hon Hai Precision Industry Co. LTD, 2015 Annual Report (2016),
http://www.foxconn.com/Files/annual_rpt_e/2015_annual_rpt_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4PC4-EP4X]; Business Philosophy, HON HAI FOXCONN TECH.
GROUP,
http://www.foxconn.com/GroupProfile_En/BusinessPhilosophy.html
[https://perma.cc/88MW-HD7Y] (last visited Nov. 2, 2018).
86 See Charles Duhigg & Keith Bradsher, How the U.S. Lost Out on iPhone Work,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
21,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/business/apple-america-and-asqueezed-middle-class.html [https://perma.cc/39GK-VMT4] (discussing how
there is nothing like Foxconn in the United States; it assembles an estimated 40
percent of the world’s consumer electronics for customers like Amazon, Dell,
Motorola, and Nintendo).
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were built in China and around the world.87 They are sometimes
referred to as “campuses” and can be found throughout the world
(e.g., Brazil, India, Japan, and Slovakia).88 The rise of regional
conglomeration is a telling example of the success of deliberate
indicative and export-promoting policies of the emerging
economies, in contrast to the failure of U.S. policies to stem the
regional dislocation and inequalities that this country has
experienced over the past couple of decades.
The developmental impact can be illustrated by the growth of
manufacturing in Shenzhen, China, which was designated a special
economic zone by the Chinese government in 1980. It immediately
began attracting business investment and corporations seeking
bases of operations. The government massively subsidized and
enabled the growth of related industries that benefited from their
proximity to one another. Now, a city that was a fishing village of
30,000 in the late 1970s, is a 10-million strong, major special
economic zone89:

87 See Dawn Chmielewski, Where Apple Products Are Born: A Rare Glimpse Inside
(Apr.
6,
2015),
Foxconn’s
Factory
Gates,
RECODE
https://www.recode.net/2015/4/6/11561130/where-apple-products-are-born-arare-glimpse-inside-foxconns-factory
[https://perma.cc/E6EM-KCGQ]
(explaining how Foxconn and Pegatron, another Apple supplier, create their supply
chain empires).
88 See FOXCONN, SPJ PARTNERS, http://www.spjintl.com/spj_foxconn.html
[https://perma.cc/7YE7-T9E4] (last visited Nov. 2, 2018) (listing Foxconn’s
numerous operational units all over the world).
89 See generally Gar-On Antony Yeh, Development of the Special Economic Zone in
Shenzhen, The People’s Republic of China, 52 EKISTICS 154 (1985).
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On the other hand, U.S. industries already dislocated by national
trends and technological changes are being completely wiped out
by their inability to compete in the global supply chain. In the
apparel/textiles industry, for example, the combination of these
factors resulted in an almost total loss of manufacturing market
share for United States concerns. Employment in the apparel
industry, in 1948, was about 1.1 million. Employment peaked in
1973 at 1.4 million. At that time, the United States produced about
95% of its apparel.90 From 1994 to 2005, the United States lost about
900,000 textile and apparel jobs.91 According to recent Department
of Labor Statistics, apparel manufacturing employed about 109,000
people as of June 2017.92 Virtually all of the manufacturing of U.S.
apparel is now done abroad.
Textile mills were previously substantial employers nationwide,
with concentration in regions like New England. Since the
beginning of the Industrial Revolution, “mill towns” had become
centers of employment and production in textiles.
The economic activities of those New England towns first shifted
down south to the Carolinas and other regions, where they became
viable industries in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.93 The continued
90 See Lauren A. Murray, Unraveling Employment Trends in Textiles and Apparel,
118 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 62, 62–66 (1995) (discussing the textile and apparel
industries and explaining relationships between employment and investment
within them).
91 See U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. TEXTILE AND APPAREL
INDUSTRIES
IN
RURAL
AMERICA
(Oct.
10,
2017),
https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/cotton-wool/background/us-textileand-apparel-industries-and-rural-america.aspx [https://perma.cc/CY2M-36HT]
(stating that the United States lost more than 900,000 textile and apparel jobs
between 1994 and 2005).
92 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, INDUSTRIES AT A GLANCE: APPAREL
MANUFACTURING:
NAICS
315,
https://www.bls.gov/iag/tgs/iag315.htm
[https://perma.cc/2U8Y-QMDT] (last visited Dec. 9, 2017) (detailing yearly
employment and labor statistics in the apparel manufacturing subsector).
93 See John F. Kennedy, New England and the South, ATLANTIC (Jan. 1954),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1954/01/new-england-andthe-south/376244/ [https://perma.cc/2U8Y-QMDT] (publishing three incisive
speeches by then Junior Senator from Massachusetts, John F. Kennedy, criticizing
labor practices that led to a migration of jobs from New England to the South). Not
surprisingly, the migration of textile mills and jobs to the South was also negatively
regarded by the newly unemployed in the North. Kennedy argues that the
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decline of American textile mills was caused by both technological
innovation and the tradability of jobs. From the 1950s to 1990s,
technology allowed production to increase while employment
decreased. Tradability of jobs, and the lower wages in the Far East,
completed the demise of the American apparel manufacturing
industry.94
The steel industry tells a similar story of regional dislocation:
technological inroads causing decreased demand for labor, and
ultimately transplantation of the industry abroad. This story,
however, also features the United States’ failure to promote and
foster the infrastructural developments that would have been
necessary for U.S. steel to compete. The decline of employment in
steel mills began with the growing reliance on centralized
production with blast furnaces, Bessemer converters, and openhearth furnaces.95 Better technology meant fewer workers were
needed to run plants. As production increased in the late twentieth
century, employment rolls declined. Then, as a result of both wage

movement of jobs to the South was partially due to federal tax exemption programs
and cheaper operations costs. See id.
94 See Justin Fox, Manufacturing Moved South, Then Moved Out, Bʟᴏᴏᴍʙᴇʀɢ
OPINION (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-1007/manufacturing-moved-south-then-it-moved-to-china
[https://perma.cc/DL8L-U7FA] (discussing the transition of manufacturing
employment from the North to the South, and then to China and elsewhere abroad).
See generally H. Peter Gray, East Asia: The Growth Center of the Late Twentieth Century,
in GLOBALIZATION AND EAST ASIA: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 15 (Khosrow
Fatemi ed., 2006) (analyzing the economic and social developments in East Asia
during the late 1900s to the early 2000s).
95 See Toshihiko Emi, Steelmaking Technology for the Last 100 Years: Towards
Highly Efficient Mass Production Systems for High Quality Steels, 55 ISIJ Iɴᴛ’ʟ 36, 36
(2015) (describing the progress of steelmaking technology over the past 100 years,
including the industry’s tendency to go through boom-and-bust cycles, and
arguing that steel mills must be equipped with the most cutting-edge equipment in
order to remain competitive, such that the lack of capital improvements has a
substantial adverse impact on the steel industry); see also Mark J. Perry, The Main
Reason for the Loss of US Steel Jobs is a Huge Increase in Worker Productivity, Not Imports,
13,
2018),
and
the
Jobs
Aren’t
Coming
Back,
AEIDEAS (Mar.
http://www.aei.org/publication/the-main-reason-for-the-loss-of-us-steel-jobs-isproductivity-and-technology-not-imports-and-theyre-not-coming-back
[https://perma.cc/EHS7-MGN6] (discussing American steel manufacturing
trends and the use of efficient mini-mills).
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competition and failure to invest in infrastructure, the steel industry
went through a substantial dislocation overseas.96
By 2017, the largest global producer of steel was China at 808
million metric tons annually.97 In 2017, by contrast, the United States
produced about 82 million metric tons.98 U.S. Steel Corporation,
America’s largest steel manufacturer, produced only about 14
million metric tons of steel in 2015—compared to Luxembourg’s
ArcelorMittal at 97 million.99 Contrast U.S. Steel and its company
town of Gary, Indiana, formerly known as “Magic City,” with the
rising Chinese steel manufacturer Baowu Steel. The mill in Gary had
employed 100,000 before cutting back to 20,000 in the early 1980s.
96 See Lydia Chavez, Bethlehem Steel to Cut 7,300 Jobs at Upstate Plant, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 28, 1982), https://www.nytimes.com/1982/12/28/business/bethlehemsteel-to-cut-7300-jobs-at-upstate-plant.html
[https://perma.cc/ZM8L-KE8H]
(“The 82-year-old Lackawanna plant, one of the oldest in the country, was a victim
of more modern and more cost-efficient operations in Europe, Japan and a number
of third world countries, which have recently developed steel industries. As a
result of this competition, American steel companies have closed inefficient plants
periodically in recent years, reducing capacity from 160 million tons in 1977 to 153
million this year.”); U.S. Dep’t of Commerce Int’l Trade Admin., Steel Import Reports:
The
United
States,
GLOBAL STEEL TRADE MONITOR,
Dec.
2017,
https://www.trade.gov/steel/countries/pdfs/2017/q3/imports-us.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3E9E-UKKC] (providing figures on the United States’ imports
of steel and finding that the United States, the world’s largest steel importer, “has
maintained a persistent trade deficit in steel products for over a decade.”). See also
Tyler Denk, By the Numbers (China Steel Production), MORNING BREW (Sept. 25, 2017),
https://www.morningbrew.com/stories/by-the-numbers-china-steel-production
[https://perma.cc/DPX7-2UKV] (discussing China’s steel production surplus and
noting that it resulted in a 39% decrease in U.S. steel prices in Q4 of 2015).
97 See TOP 10 LARGEST STEEL PRODUCING COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD, STEELTECHNOLOGY.COM, https://www.steel-technology.com/articles/top-largest-steelproducing-countries-in-the-world [https://perma.cc/YD8F-2HYF] (last visited
Dec. 14, 2018) (“China surpassed all goals and reached a staggering 808.4 million
metric tons of crude steel in 2016,” and “witnessed an unimaginable growth of
364% since 2009.”).
98
STEEL PRODUCTION FIGURES IN THE U.S. FROM 2006 TO 2017, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/209343/steel-production-in-the-us/
[https://perma.cc/NR99-SGL3] (last visited Dec. 14, 2018) (“In 2017, around 82
million metric tons of steel was produced here. Basic oxygen furnaces accounted
for 32 percent of the country’s total steel production.”).
99 See
WORLD STEEL ASSOC., WORLD STEEL IN FIGURES 8 (2016),
https://www.worldsteel.org/en/dam/jcr:1568363d-f735-4c2c-a1dae5172d8341dd/World+Steel+in+Figures+2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KZJ98QYC] (detailing the statistics of world steel production by country and by
producer in 2015).
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Now, the city is plagued by unemployment or underemployment,
crime, poverty, and untreated drug addiction.100 Baowu Steel, on
the other hand, currently employs about 230,000 people—mainly in
rural, semi-industrialized areas.101
These developments are major contributors to the economic
insecurity of the America’s Chronically Excluded. Following the
loss of manufacturing jobs, the services industry provided a natural
outlet for the Chronically Excluded. In the next Section, we discuss
how high-gear globalized integration is on the verge of displacing
opportunities provided by the services industry and shifting them
to the Global Middle Class.
4.3. The Globalization of Services
Until 1995, the liberalization of the global markets—except in the
case of regional economic arrangements like the European common
market—only affected goods. In 1995, the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS) was implemented as a result of the
Uruguay Round.102 This launched a round of outsourcing of
services in several industries. Industries with the highest rate of
outsourcing have been informational technology, banking and
financial services, and life sciences and health care. In the field of
medical transcription services, for example, the value of globalized
services was $41.4 billion in 2012 and it is expected to reach $60.6
100 See Don Terry, Where Work Disappears and Dreams Die, AM. PROSPECT (July
2, 2012), http://prospect.org/article/where-work-disappears-and-dreams-die
[https://perma.cc/8PDF-2NTR] (chronicling life in Gary, Indiana following the
departure of manufacturing jobs over the last couple of decades); Urban Exploration:
Gary, Indiana, Ghost Town, FORBIDDEN-PLACES, http://www.forbiddenplaces.net/urban-exploration-gary-indiana-ghost-town?cmtx_page=77#1
[https://perma.cc/J6LX-NC5S] (last visited Feb. 5, 2018) (compiling comments of
current and former residents of Gary, Indiana and their impressions of the town
following the departure of manufacturing jobs).
101 See China Baowu Steel Group Officially Established, STEEL ORBIS (Dec. 1, 2016),
https://www.steelorbis.com/steel-news/latest-news/china-baowu-steel-groupofficially-established-961443.htm [https://perma.cc/T22L-TXRG] (noting that
China Baowu, the world’s second-largest steel producer, employs 228,000 people).
102
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S.
183, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994).
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billion in 2019.103 Countries like India and the Philippines are widely
viewed as reliable places to outsource services. The medical
transcription industry is closely related to the growth of the healthcare market. The passage of the ACA and the Patient Protection Act
increased the incentives to outsource. In 2012, about 60% of all
medical transcription services were outsourced.104
The gradual increase in outsourcing of services affects the
United States markets in three major respects that are relevant to our
analysis. First, there is a substantial body of research showing that
outsourcing impacts mainly lower-skilled services jobs.105 Here
again, technological advancement combines with lower wages to
displace American opportunities.
In addition, the evidence
supports the conclusion that outsourcing suppresses wages for the
jobs that remain in the United States.106 The upshot is that the
outsourcing of services that came in the wake of the GATS has a
disparate impact on the Chronically Excluded. The lower-waged
jobs that they transitioned to are structurally bound to become as
tradable as the manufacturing jobs.107
The third and potentially most harmful impact of the tradability
of services jobs is that, combined with the technology revolution, the
103 Global Medical Transcription Services Market to be Driven by Developing
Healthcare IT Industry, TRANSPARENCY MKT. RES. (Jan. 29, 2016),
https://www.transparencymarketresearch.com/pressrelease/medicaltranscription-services.htm [https://perma.cc/65K8-8ELZ].
104 Global Medical Transcription Services Market, CISION PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 9,
2015),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/global-medicaltranscription-services-market-300032951.html [https://perma.cc/6KNV-W3BG].
105 See, e.g., Avraham Ebenstein, Ann Harrison, Margaret McMillan &
Shannon Phillips, Estimating the Impact of Trade and Offshoring on American Workers
Using the Current Population Surveys, 96 REV. ECON. & STAT. 581, 582 (2014) (finding
that ”workers in routine occupations, such as those employed in blue-collar
production occupations, have suffered the greatest losses from globalization.”).
106 See id. (“We examine the impact of globalization on U.S. workers by
focusing attention on how they are affected by imports, exports, and offshoring to
low- and high-income countries. Our results indicate that a 10% increase in
occupational exposure to import competition is associated with nearly a 3.0%
decline in real wages for workers who perform routine tasks among workers in our
1984 to 2002 sample and a 4.4% decline for workers taken from 1997 to 2002.”).
107 See id. (“[W]e find that occupation switching due to trade led to real wage
losses of 12 to 17 percentage points between 1984 and 2002. Any analysis of the
wage effects of globalization that is restricted to manufacturing workers would
miss the downward pressure on wages resulting from workers leaving
manufacturing and entering the service sector.”(footnote omitted)).
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next frontier in the tradability of American jobs will, by most
accounts, involve the retail services industry. For the Chronically
Excluded, economic opportunity in the retail services industry has
been an essential component of financial survival. Beyond
providing a lifeline to former manufacturing communities in the
heartland, retail has also sheltered urban areas from the kind of
economic stagnation and lack of security that has plagued
manufacturing. However, the decline of the services industry is
highly likely to substantially impact this retail services fallback
option.
For example, in early 2017 retail stores began a major wave of
closures.108 The rise of e-commerce joins extraordinary advances in
information technology, individualized delivery and shipping, and
the diversification of an American corporation dedicated to the
maximization of capital.109 More Americans are shopping on eretailers like Amazon for an increasingly wide array of products.110
Amazon is investing in delivery technology, such as drones, that
“Wal-Martize” the individual consumer.111 No longer is a retailer’s
economy of scale, and a visit to a physical store, necessary to import
a Chinese product into the American living room. Leveraging
profits from its streaming services and other cash-earning divisions,
Amazon can invest in distribution centers that, in time, will make

108 See Suzanne Kapner, Brick-and-Mortar Stores Are Shuttering at a Record Pace,
Wᴀʟʟ Sᴛ. J. (Apr. 21, 2017, 7:53 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/brick-andmortar-stores-are-shuttering-at-a-record-pace-1492818818
[https://perma.cc/6CZE-3MSV] (detailing the increased rate of store closures by
American retailers due to decades of overbuilding and the rise of online shopping).
109 See generally JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967)
(detailing the impact of technological advances and innovation on the evolution of
the American industrial system).
110 See Tracey Wallace, 2018 Omni-Channel Buying Report, BɪɢCᴏᴍᴍᴇʀᴄᴇ,
https://www.bigcommerce.com/blog/omni-channel-retail/
[https://perma.cc/RN5A-EGKL] (describing consumer shopping habits in 2018 by
generation and buying destination channels).
111 See Michael Lierow et al, Amazon is Using Logistics to Lead a Retail Revolution,
(Feb.
18,
2016,
4:39
PM),
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/oliverwyman/2016/02/18/amazon-is-usinglogistics-to-lead-a-retail-revolution/#2c7132aa4e43
[http://perm.cc/D5WATTRK] (describing Amazon’s experimentation in delivery logistics to find more
ways to customize delivery options for the individual consumer).
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each American consumer an import enterprise with an almost
unfettered capacity to shop China’s factors.112
The globalized marketplace in services provides opportunities
for American businesses. Those opportunities tend to be at the
higher end of the spectrum, where the U.S. has been a successful
exporter. The Chronically Excluded, however, are generally illequipped to compete in high-skilled services sectors. Consider, by
way of example, the breakdown of the export of U.S. services to
China:

Not only do the bulk of the economic opportunities involve
higher-skilled services, but they tend to be based in major
metropolitan areas. This exacerbates the regional imbalances that
the tradability of jobs in the manufacturing sector has caused, and
the attendant impact on the Chronically Excluded.113

112 See generally Jean-Francois Houde, Peter Newberry & Katia Seim, Economies
of Density in E-Commerce: A Study of Amazon’s Fulfillment Center Network (Nat’l
Bureau
of
Econ.
Research,
Working Paper No.
23361,
2017),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w23361.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZZW5-GQ9B]
(investigating economies of scale in distribution through Amazon case study and
discussing the fulfillment center investment business model). See generally Ben
Fractenberg, Amazon Distribution Center on Staten Island to Bring 2,250 Full-Time Jobs,
DNAINFO
(Sept. 6, 2017, 2:56 PM), https://www.dnainfo.com/newyork/20170906/bloomfield/amazon-facility-staten-island
[https://perma.cc/2D5L-C9VC] (discussing how the establishing of an Amazon
distribution center will create thousands of new jobs, putting New York at the
forefront of the “growing global innovation economy.”).
113
For discussion and analysis of regional imbalances, see MORETTI, supra note
80.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol40/iss2/1

2019]

Global Economic Constitutionalism

365

As we explained above, the high-gear globalized integration
manifested itself beyond transforming the nature of the global
markets. In the following Section, we will explore the changes in the
nature of work and the corporation that characterize the rising GEC
3.0 economic order. Here as well, we will not only explore the
impact of the changes on the place of the American economy in the
GEC, but focus in particular on their negative adverse effect on the
Chronically Excluded.
4.4. Changes in the Nature of Work and the Corporation
The economic model for the nature of work and the role of the
corporation in labor markets has shifted in the early stages of GEC
3.0.114 The relationship of mutual dependence between labor and
capital that characterized GEC 2.0 has eroded. Economists like
Gerald Davis of the University of Michigan have identified salient
changes in the nature of the corporation and work that are pertinent
to our analysis. During the first half-century of trade after World
War II, the government partnered up with corporations with large
workforces. Substantial revenues and a rich balance sheet went
hand-in-hand with a need for a stable staff. The middle class thrived
with this system. The government regulated the market, the
corporations, and provided a safety net for those who fell off the
grid.115
The entrepreneurial Middle Class of GEC 3.0, including the
high-tech platform economy,116 does not create jobs on a scale
comparable to the dominant enterprises of the 20th century, in

114 See DAVIS, CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 56.
For an analysis of the
emergence of the “sharing economy”, see ARUN SUNDARAJAN, THE SHARING
ECONOMY: THE END OF EMPLOYMENT AND THE RISE OF CROWD-BASED CAPITALISM, 1–
18; 108–130 (2016).
115 See DAVIS, CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 56.
116 See Antonia Davlia et al., The Rise and Fall of Startups: Creation and
Destruction of Revenue and Jobs by Young Companies, 40 AUST. J. MGM’T. 6, 26 (2015)
(discussing how “Discovery-type startup ventures build head count, but then
encounter technical or market problems that cause a reversal of proper growth,”
particularly in the life sciences area where front-end investments are more readily
available to explore the potential of new technologies).
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particular those involved in the manufacturing and sale of goods.117
Kodak and other companies with high-value balance sheets and
assets would employ hundreds of thousands of workers and rely on
the stability of a career workforce.118 Today, a company like Uber is
valued at tens of billions of dollars, while employing only
approximately 16,000 individuals.119 Trade-dependent companies
such as Walmart have grown to be the principal mass suppliers of
jobs in the United States, even as traditional employers in the
services or manufacturing sectors (such as General Electric) are
shrinking.120
In addition, we are moving increasingly from a career to a jobor task- based (gig-based) economy, while automation is further
117 See Michael Spence, The Impact of Globalization on Income and Employment, 90
FOREIGN AFF. 28, 30 (2011) (“Dramatic new labor-saving technologies in the
information services eliminated some jobs across the whole U.S. economy . . . many
manufacturing activities . . . have been moving to emerging economies. This trend
is causing employment to fall in virtually all of the U.S. manufacturing sector . . . .”).
118 See GERALD F. DAVIS, THE VANISHING AMERICAN CORPORATION: NAVIGATING
THE HAZARDS OF A NEW ECONOMY, 44, 88 (2016) [hereinafter DAVIS, VANISHING
AMERICAN CORPORATION] (“Both [Sony and Eastman Kodak] had large and loyal
workforces and large obligations to their employees and communities. Their ability
to meet those obligations is what made them stable employers and good citizens.”).
Corporations were once healthily melded to American middle-class life—many
Americans were securely employed with large companies.
Modern day
corporations like Facebook and Zulily are different than Walmart and McDonalds,
for example. They employ fewer people in fewer locations around the United States
and require a very particular skill set for employment. See, e.g., id. at 92 (discussing
how, in spite of its large market capitalization, Facebook employs a comparatively
tiny number of employees).
119 See Samantha Kelly, Inside Uber: How the Company Attracts Top Talent Despite
Its
Reputation,
CNN
(Feb.
22,
2017,
3:39
AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2017/02/14/technology/uber-corporateculture/index.html. [https://perma.cc4N8T-XKCP] (discussing how Uber has
attracted over 10,000 “non-driver” workers); UBER, COMPANY INFO,
https://www.uber.com/newsroom/company-info/ [https://perma.cc/5ALNLK6V] (last visited Nov. 13, 2018) (“There are over 16,000 employees at Uber as of
2017”); see also DAVIS, CAPITAL MARKETS, supra note 56, at 1–2 (discussing the rise of
the gig economy and noting that “[b]y the end of 2014, Uber had more driverpartners in the U.S. than General Motors had employees.”). See generally David Lee,
Uber Fires 20 Staff After Harassment Investigation, BBC NEWS (June 7, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-40179472 [https://perma.cc/6VEU-SX9R]
(discussing Uber’s harassment investigation among employees).
120 See DAVIS, VANISHING AMERICAN CORPORATION, supra note 118 (discussing
companies meeting obligations and the relation to loyal workforces and corporate
governance).
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displacing the opportunities that have been natural outlets for
dislocated manufacturing actors.121 The national constitutional
structure, in particular the welfare system at the disposal of the
national government, does not adequately address the
transformation of the market. The welfare system is constructed on
a career-based model of employment.122 Consider, for example, the
unemployment and minimum wage schemes. The welfare system
recognizes that unemployment may occur in between stable jobs. In
the absence of income from the career job, the State will provide a
substitute source of income.123 Virtually all welfare schemes can be
explained and understood in relation to this model of work.
Disability insurance presupposes the existence of adequate jobs
which the worker has become unable to perform by reason of
physical or mental illness.124 Retirement funds assume a steady
career-worth of contributions to a social scheme that is responsible
for payouts to workers concluding their careers.125

121 See LOUIS HYMAN, TEMP: HOW AMERICAN WORK,
THE AMERICAN DREAM BECAME TEMPORARY, 127–41 (2018)

AMERICAN BUSINESS, AND
(discussing generally the
increasingly temporary or gig aspect of work and how the rise of automation
transformed available jobs from full-time to temporary and consultancy work). The
next phase in the impact of information technology on work will be in the fields of
Artificial Intelligence and Robotics. See generally RICHARD BALDWIN, THE GLOBOTICS
UPHEAVAL: GLOBALISATION, ROBOTICS AND THE FUTURE OF WORK (2019).
122 See RICK WARTZMAN & PETER SAUNDERS, THE ENDS AND MEANS OF WELFARE
WITH ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AUSTRILIA 95 (2002) (“[T]he emergence of
mass unemployment has had fundamental consequences for the welfare state.
Widespread unemployment has brought into question the relevance and viability
of many welfare programs that were designed on the assumption of full
employment.”). See generally RICK WARTZMAN, THE END OF LOYALTY: THE RISE AND
FALL OF GOOD JOBS IN AMERICA 4, 7 (2017) (discussing the origins of welfare in the
“corporate welfare” system through which large corporations, such as Eastman
Kodak, provided a steady and increasing income along with robust benefits
packages through employment over the life of a worker).
123 See generally Kenneth Casebeer, Unemployment Insurance, American Social
Wage, Labor Organization, and Legal Ideology, 35 BOS. COLL. L. Rᴇᴠ. 259 (1994)
(discussing the role of organized labor in the enactment of the Unemployment
Insurance component of the Social Security Act).
124 See Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion: The Role of Disability in the
Social Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. Rᴇᴠ. 361, 362 (1996) (“All of our public benefit
programs attempt to reconcile the demand of the market economy for labor and the
concomitant moral obligation to work, with a desire to help those in need.”).
125
In countries like France where a minimum guaranteed income exists, the
State also recognizes that in extreme cases some market actors fall completely off
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Notwithstanding those structural changes, neither national
governments like that of the United States, nor the International
Institutions of trade, have upgraded their basic norms and
institutional frameworks to adjust to the GEC 3.0 reality. This is the
root of the current crisis of legitimacy. In the next Part, we will start
by outlining our understanding of what gives a GEC legitimacy, and
then move on to proposing reforms for both the International
Institutions and State Law.
5. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
What gives an international legal system its legitimacy? Is it
principally its formal acceptance after a national constitutional
process, such as the ratification of a treaty by a national assembly
with the requisite vote? To what extent does the system require
social acceptance by the national constituents of its member
States?126 And what happens when the public mood shifts? Can the
existence of the international system be conditioned on its continued
acceptance by the national constituents? Can an international
system “pause” during a period of crisis to allow the participating
States to rethink basic norms and to restructure and reclaim eroding
legitimacy? If that is the case, at what point does a sufficiently
pronounced decrease in the popularity of a system become cause for
declaring it illegitimate? And what is a State to do about it:
unilaterally dissolve, restructure, or attempt to renegotiate a treaty?
These questions lie at the core of the challenges that international
trade and international economic integration regimes across the
the social grid. For them, a small monthly handout (approximately 500 euros in
France) ensures their ability to live with a minimum amount of dignity.
126 See generally Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82
Aᴍ. J. Iɴᴛ’ʟ L. 705 (1988) (discussing broadly how states obey international law even
though it is voluntary); Ian Hurd, Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,
53 Iɴᴛ’ʟ Oʀɢ. 379 (1999) (addressing reasons that states abide by the international
system, and discussing that the legitimacy of international law is not so black and
white as many believe from a theoretical or empirical standpoint); Julia Black,
Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory
Regimes, 2008 REG. & GOVERNANCE 137 (explaining the dynamic between
transnational regulatory systems in terms of legitimacy and accountability and in
turn how regulators respond to them).
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modern liberal democratic world are facing today. Whether we
view legitimacy from a formal or social acceptance point of view, it
is undeniable that the international economic system is going
through a crisis of legitimacy. Our claim is that the crisis of
legitimacy, and the rise of economic nationalism, is a direct result of
the rise of a new Class of interlocutors of the State and of the GEC,
which we have identified as the Chronically Excluded.127 Our
theory of legitimacy hearkens back to the relationship between the
Global Economic Constitution and the State’s internal constitutional
construct. In order to understand this relationship, we must first
identify those interlocutors of the State whose collective acceptance
of the international system translates into its legitimacy. Who are
the people whose opinions matter so much that, as a group, they can
confer legitimacy on the international regime? Our claim is that, in
GEC 1.0, Capital and the limited, nascent Middle Class that
collaborated with it to industrialize were the Stakeholders whose
acceptance of the system was necessary for it to achieve legitimacy.
In GEC 2.0, the expanded Middle Class—including Labor and
Capital with constitutionally aligned interests—comprised the
Stakeholders.128
In GEC 3.0, two related phenomena have developed: First, Labor
and Capital have become misaligned. Capital is once again a Class
of its own with interests in globalized markets at odds with those of
Labor. Second, the Chronically Excluded have broken away from
the Middle Class. This means that the Middle Class base of
interlocutors who conferred legitimacy on GEC 2.0 now includes a
large and growing segment that does not accept the system as it
currently stands. Meanwhile, as we have explained above, the State
and the International Institutions have continued to operate based
on a system designed for GEC 2.0. Furthermore, all of the GEC 3.0
economic trends that we have identified show that the increasingly
greater numbers of Middle Class members in the United States will
127
This is not simply a matter of “populism.” See Duane Swank & HansGeorg Betz, Globalization, the Welfare State and Right-Wing Populism in Western
Europe, 1 SOCIO-ECON. Rᴇᴠ. 215 (2003) (presenting empirical evidence implying that
the social legitimacy of international trade is affected by national systems of social
protection).
128 See GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE MARKETS: HOW FINANCE RE-SHAPED
AMERICA (2009) (discussing the impact of shareholders on business and economic
models).
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be excluded from the integration enterprise. As tradability takes on
new forms, fueled by technological advances and transformation of
the nature of jobs and Capital, the ranks of the Chronically Excluded
and their insecurity are bound to deepen.129
In this Part, we outline, in broad terms, the reforms that GEC
should undertake nationally and internationally in order to upgrade
to its 3.0 version.
5.1. The Temptation of Protectionism
Economic nationalism and populism call for a return to the
policies of protectionism that have characterized GEC 1.0. While we
argue below for a certain measure of protection for the most
vulnerable segments of the U.S. markets, we categorically reject the
notion that a return to protectionism would be beneficial for the U.S.
economy (or the global markets). Those measures would constitute
a return to policies that ceased making sense about a century ago.
As we have argued, the tradability of jobs is not simply a matter of
lower labor costs or access to resources, which can be offset by
tariffs. Instead, the liberalization of the globalized markets is the
product of regional conglomeration, long-standing exportpromotion policies, changes in the nature of work and the
corporation, historical levels of national investment, automation,
and other complex mechanisms which can no longer be reversed. If
the United States sought to gain an advantage in the global markets
by imposing tariffs or other old-fashioned forms of protectionism, it
would simply create a vacuum that would be filled by other trading
States.
We also believe that it is possible to maintain an international
trade system that fosters growth while preserving national
democratic mechanisms and achieving adequate levels of
redistributive justice, provided that reforms are implemented to
upgrade the United States welfare system to GEC 3.0 levels.
129 See Dani Rodrik, After Neoliberalism What? (Aug. 2002) (unpublished
manuscript),
http://cemi.ehess.fr/docannexe/file/2787/rodrik2002.pdf
[http://perma.cc/6XB4-GC49] (rejecting the view that Western governments can
impose a set of reforms that fit neatly into developing economies, and arguing that
any blueprints must take into account local circumstances and needs).
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Professor Dani Rodrik, one of the most thoughtful economic voices
commenting on economic nationalism, developed an “impossibility
theorem” to make sense of the global economy. He sees it defined
by three components: the Nation State, democracy and deep global
economic integration. In the tension between the Nation State and
democracy, Rodrik believes that “hyper-globalization” undermines
democracy.130
In fact, Rodrik speculates that the global surge in populism is the
“nation” pushing back against loss of control over the domestic
economy. He speaks of a “trilemma,” which makes it impossible to
maintain Nation State, democracy, and globalization all at once. In
his construct, only a combination of two of the three structures can
be maintained. Rodrik sees the Nation State as indispensable to
economic prosperity. The reason the Nation State is so essential to
the global economy is that it is only in virtue of the institutional
structures found in Nation States that the economy can be viable not
just for the wealthy one percent but for everyone. Of course,
democratic governance is an indispensable component of the Nation
States. The upshot is that globalization must be stopped in order for
a democratic Nation State to remain viable. Populism is a reaction
to globalization’s undermining of the domestic infrastructure that
delivers economic prosperity to the nation.
The Nation State is important both to the global economy and to
the people of the nations that have pushed back against the
expansion of cosmopolitanism and global trade. But we think that
Rodrik’s account of why the Nation State is important is misguided
in several important ways. Most importantly, we think that Rodrik
misunderstands and thus mischaracterizes how the Nation State can
prosper in an age of increasing globalization.131 First, the economic
ills, present and future, of the United States and the other wealthy
nations of the world cannot be cured unless these States upgrade
their policy and regulatory tools. The displaced coal worker in West
Virginia or the auto worker in Detroit will not find any relief from
their economic distress through anything the Nation State might do
for them with its existing regulatory tools. What is needed above all
else is a shift from a welfare model to one where the State’s basic
obligation to the nation is to increase the availability of economic
See DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX 184–207 (2011).
See generally QUINN SLOBODIAN, GLOBALISTS: THE END OF EMPIRE AND THE
BIRTH OF NEOPLIBERALISM (2018) (providing an account of the history of
neoliberalism and the importance of states).
130
131
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opportunity.
Second, the United States should not reject
globalization but, instead, couple the necessary overhaul of the
welfare regime with upgraded trade policies designed to turn the
global supply chain to its benefit.
We take on these policy proposals seriatim below, starting with
the overhaul of the welfare-delivery system.
5.2. Rethinking Economic Security and Opportunity: the DIP
Government exists to deliver order to an otherwise Hobbesian
universe.132 Since GEC 2.0 became the global economic constitution,
the government’s legitimacy depends on its success in delivering
welfare to the Middle Class. Today, as detailed above, the policy
tools of GEC 2.0 are no longer effective. The corporate welfare
platform has significantly eroded and can no longer be counted on
by the government to provide front-line delivery to a significant
segment of the Middle Class.133 The technological revolution, the
rise of the Global Middle Class, changes in the nature of work, and
the globalization of markets into regional and industrial
overlapping associations have also hindered the government’s
ability to deliver welfare using GEC 2.0 tools.
Instead of regulating the corporate base, and providing a social
safety net assuming its existence, the government must become a
nimble, proactive partner with the individual citizen.134 We call the
shift in regulatory focus “person-centered welfare.” Its gist is to
remove obstacles to economic opportunity, whether they are lack of
skills, geographical immobility, or inability to compete in a platform
market, to create a branch of government that would become “the
address” for the Chronically Excluded to maintain economic
security, and for the Middle Class generally to have access to
meaningful economic security programs consistent with GEC 3.0.
132 See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974)
(discussing the role of government and advocating for a minimal state).
133 See Francis Fukuyama, The Future of History: Can Liberal Democracy Survive
the Decline of the Middle Class?, 91 FOREIGN AFF. 53, 58–59 (2012) (positing that the
social contract in developing countries is coming under pressure as middle class
incomes fall or stagnate due to globalization and outsourcing).
134
Some characteristics of the system we propose could be found in the
Danish welfare system. See generally Per Kongshøj Madsen, The Danish Model of
Flexicurity: A Paradise—with Some Snakes, in LABOUR MARKET AND SOCIAL
PROTECTION REFORMS IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 243, 244–57 (Hedva Sarfati &
Giuliano Bonoli eds., 2002).
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The Administrative State regulating the market, its corporations,
and actors, does not disappear in our model. We still need a
Securities and Exchange Commission to protect investors and
promote disclosure. Environmental and labor agencies are still
needed, and so are banking and other regulators whose jobs are to
protect the economy against market failures. However, in order to
successfully address the early challenges of GEC 3.0, the State must
adopt a role closer to an indicative planner, provider of necessary
resources, and general source of support for the Middle Class and,
in particular, the growing class of people who have been falling
through the GEC 2.0 regulatory net.135
Reforms could start with the establishment of an institution
dedicated to planning and enabling economic opportunity. For
purposes of developing a plausible scenario, we will make this
institution a new cabinet-level department, which we will call
Department of Indicative Planning and Economic Security (the DIP).
The job of the DIP would be to devise and manage, from a macroeconomic standpoint, programs that assist the Chronically
Excluded, but also (as described in greater detail below) devise and
implement policies and programs for maximizing national
engagement with the global supply chain.
The DIP would operate Employment and Economic Security
Centers (EECs) across the United States. The DIP would be charged
with ensuring that there is a sufficient pool of national jobs and
economic opportunity to provide for the economic welfare of the
Middle Class, and in identifying broadly the obstacles to individual
access to opportunity. The EECs would operate on a micro level to
implement and administer programs devised by the DIP.
The job of these institutions goes well beyond the retraining of
Chronically Excluded workers or assistance with identifying and
securing economic opportunities, although those would also be
important functions. The DIP’s fundamental goal would be
indicative: to identify and structure the programs necessary to
135
Japan, for instance, rebuilt its social and economic infrastructure after
World War II through policies of indicative planning spearheaded by its Ministry
of International Trade and Industry (MITI). See MIKIO SUMIYA, A HISTORY OF
JAPANESE TRADE AND INDUSTRY POLICY 47–49 (2000) (summarizing a 17-volume
Japanese language history of indicative planning policies from 1945 to 1979 that had
been commissioned by MITI).
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maximize individual ability to compete in uncertain and rapidly
changing markets. By way of example: The World Economic Forum
is predicting that 65% of today’s elementary school children will
work in jobs that do not exist yet.136 This raises a significant question
with deep consequences for the future economic health of the U.S.:
How do we educate a workforce for future markets and competition
that we have yet to identify? The DIP and EECs will be charged with
that task. This might include coordination with the Department of
Education and local agencies to, for example, provide coding and
other skills training for their students.
Likewise, the DIP and the EECs would be tasked with devising
programs to correct the regional disparities that we have identified.
Expensive programs including subsidies and other expenditures
have been tried in regions like coal country in Pennsylvania, as well
as other countries that went through similar declines such as
France’s Pas-de-Calais.137 Those programs have been met with
limited success, in part because of the need to maintain them in place
in order to sustain the relief that they provide. The DIP would be
tasked with devising innovative programs consistent with the GEC
3.0 economic structure. For example, the DIP could enable the
establishment of “economic clusters” in affected regions.
Legislation is currently pending for the creation of region-specific
investment funds designed to enable the aggregation of
manufacturing, customers, and developments. Public-private
partnerships, as well as grants to research institutions, provide
promising prospects to establish successful counterparts to the
special economic zones that have fueled exports abroad. The DIP,

136 See The Future of Jobs: Employment, Skills and Workforce Strategy For the Fourth
Industrial
Revolution,
WORLD
ECON.
FORUM
(2016),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Future_of_Jobs.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/Y6LP-3XBQ] (“By one popular estimate, 65% of children
entering primary school today will ultimately end up working in completely new
job types that don’t yet exist.”).
137 See, e.g., Globalization Has Marginalized Many Regions in the Rich World: What
(Oct.
21,
2017),
Can
be
Done
to
Help
Them,
ECONOMIST
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2017/10/21/globalisation-hasmarginalised-many-regions-in-the-rich-world
[https://perma.cc/7QJK-K745]
(illustrating the disappointing results of state subsidies in Pennsylvania to attract
jobs and investments to chronically underperforming regions).
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assisted by the EECs, will have jurisdiction over management of
projects of this type.
On a related front, one of the comparative disadvantages of the
United States, and cause for the rise of the Chronically Excluded, is
rising geographic immobility. This is caused by several factors:
retirement systems that do not provide for transferability of benefits,
high cost of housing making moves to cities for lesser-skilled jobs
economically infeasible, or simply the aging of the population and
the need for elder care. One additional concern is that, if those able
to move to pursue opportunities do so, the problem of regional
disparities will become even more acute because the older and/or
less skilled population segments will be left behind. Geographic
mobility still makes sense for some population groups, but it is made
difficult by structural and economic limitations such as those
mentioned above.138 One of the jobs of the DIP and the EECs would
be to assist in relocation, whether by way of training, linking with
existing opportunities, or removing regulatory disincentives.
The EECs would also operate what we conceptualize as
comprehensive support services for the unemployed and
marginally employed (“Employment Poles”). The Employment
Poles would serve as a job search center, a training school, and a
coaching program. The job search center would identify available
opportunities, whether jobs or gigs. The training school would,
wherever possible, coordinate with potential employers the level of
skills that displaced workers need to achieve to be placed. The
coaching center would assist them in applying for jobs, in
coordinating the portable social protection system work described
below, and in retaining employment.

138 See id. (“[P]eople in the rich world are less able and willing to move to
thriving places than in the past. America . . . has settled down a lot.”); see also Maria
L La Ganga, Ordinary People Can’t Afford a Home in San Francisco: How Did it Come to
This?,
Gᴜᴀʀᴅɪᴀɴ
(Aug.
5,
2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/aug/05/high-house-prices-sanfrancisco-tech-boom-inequality [https://perma.cc/7LA8-D8PQ] (documenting the
housing affordability crisis in San Francisco).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

376

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 40:2

5.3. Portable Social Protection System
Person-Centered Welfare should also include a portable social
protection system that will account for the changing nature of our
economy, including the part-time nature of gigs and business cycles
that may include high-revenue periods as well as slumps. Here as
well, the DIP and the EEC would have primary responsibility for
developing and overseeing the operations of the portable social
protection system. For purposes of developing a scenario that
illustrates the general direction that we advocate, we will discuss a
hypothetical new government tool, a “social account,” that would
accompany citizens through their working lives.139
The social account would both be an instrument of economic
security and a way for the government to stimulate economic
activity. For economic security, social accounts would operate as a
form of person-centered taxation.
Account holders would
contribute to them while working or in business. They would have
the right to withdraw from it, in the form of a tax-free loan, in
periods of low business. The social account would be the repository
of retirement savings and the link to stable, uninterrupted health
care.140 For economic opportunity, the social account would be an
access tool. For example, the EECs would be the vehicle to apply for
entrepreneurial loans or tuition aid. Likewise, if opportunity
seeking requires geographical relocation, then the social account
could be used for that purpose. Portable social accounts have been
discussed in the private and public sectors, and in scholarship. A
tool of that nature, in the government’s panoply, would gradually
evolve and be refined in light of continuing experience.

139 See David Rolf & Nick Hanauer, Portable Benefits for an Insecure Workforce,
AM. PROSPECT (Feb. 23, 2017), http://prospect.org/article/portable-benefitsinsecure-workforce [https://perma.cc/XC5L-QFLW] (proposing a new system of
portable employment benefits that accrue regardless of the worker’s status vis-àvis the employer).
140 See generally Monica Rondon, Policies to Protect Workers in the Patchwork
Economy:
Portable
Benefits,
Cᴇɴᴛᴜʀʏ
Fᴏᴜɴᴅ.
(Aug.
22,
2017),
https://tcf.org/content/commentary/policies-protect-workers-patchworkeconomy-portable-benefits/ [https://perma.cc/4RB4-3RCA] (describing a
portable benefits fund bill in Washington State that “would provide workers with
industrial insurance (workers compensation), and the option to allocate
contributions to other benefits like health insurance, paid leave and retirement
benefits.”).
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5.4. Support for Life-Long Gig Worker
The DIP would be the government’s address for the “life-long
entrepreneur,” creating and managing ongoing business in the new
economy. The State could tap into the social conscience of educated
Americans, and create a Small Business Corps of young graduates
of professional schools. Those professionals would be assigned to
EECs, and tasked with teaching, coaching, and assisting
entrepreneurs and gig workers with the management of their
economic activity. Whether it be resume writing or crafting an
application for funding the social account, the Small Business Corps
would be deployed throughout the United States to assist. Creative
ways, consistent with the GEC 3.0, could be devised to raise the
funds necessary for such a grand project. For example, the
government could give companies that do not repatriate profits
because of the associated corporate tax a one-time opportunity to do
so at a very low tax rate, say 10%. This would be akin to the tax
amnesty regimes that allow nationals to repatriate assets that
previously escaped taxation, subject to drastically lowered taxation
rates, in order to raise capital for the domestic jurisdiction.141
5.5. Turning the Global Supply Chain to Our Benefit: Regional
Agreements
The DIP’s indicative planning functions would include devising
and implementing trade policies intended to turn the global supply
chain to the benefit of U.S. business. Regional agreements are a
powerful tool to accomplish this goal in that they can be used to
identify export-promoting policies and lingering tariffs that hinder
market access, such as the ones that have helped Asian
manufacturing centers to thrive.
Although comprehensive
agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership are most effective,
regional agreements can be reached for limited periods of times to
141 See, e.g., Gabriel Gotlib, Fernando M. Vaquero, & Maria-Paul Castelli,
Argentina Has Released a New Amnesty Tax Regime, MONDAQ (July 11, 2016),
http://www.mondaq.com/Argentina/x/508468/tax+authorities/Argentina+Has
+Released+a+New+Tax+Amnesty+Regime
[https://perma.cc/DM9A-H7C2]
(applying tax regime of 0% to 15%, with cap of 10% for returns filed before specified
date). See generally ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, THE CHESSBOARD AND THE WEB:
STRATEGIES OF CONNECTION IN A NETWORKED WORLD (2017).
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deal with discrete issues. We call those “regional small-scale
contracts.”
As trading partners acquire ever-increasing market shares, their
access to U.S. markets should be conditioned on the lowering of
tariffs that today still reflect the preferential treatment given to them
after decolonization enterprises. For example, in Japan and
Vietnam, import tariffs are 19% and 16%, respectively. The TPP that
the Trump Administration rejected included a drastic reduction of
these tariffs.142 A small-scale contract should be negotiated with
those countries to accomplish this tariff-reduction goal, outside the
scope of the TPP, failing which access to the U.S. markets will be
limited for other goods. This is necessary to prevent agricultural
exporters like Brazil and Russia to take over markets that would be
natural outlets for U.S. goods. Known as “breadbaskets”, these
countries already take up a sizeable share of the global wheat,
soybean, and corn marketplace. Soybean and corn were exported
out of Brazil at values of $19 billion143 and $4.01 billion144 annually,
respectively. These exports make their way to Japan and Singapore:
markets the United States would have had access to. Brazil’s corn
exports to Japan were worth about $517 million in 2016.145 Russia’s
corn exports to Japan are currently worth $30.5 million146 and would
have been threatened by U.S. farms’ entry into the Asian market. As
discussed below, we believe that the GEC 3.0 international rule of
law should permit such negotiations and the suspension of market
access benefits if post-colonization level tariffs are not redressed.

142 See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Annex 2-D, Feb. 4, 2016 (signed,
not ratified), https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/transpacific-partnership/tpp-full-text [https://perma.cc/9NBA-4LZN] (indicating how
tariff schedules would be affected, either by elimination or reduction).
143
OEC, SOYBEANS, https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/hs92/1201/
[https://perma.cc/UE7X-2677].
144
OEC,
CORN,
https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/hs92/1005/
[https://perma.cc/7H8T-P733].
145
OEC,
WHAT
DOES
BRAZIL
EXPORT
TO
JAPAN?
(2016),
https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/jpn/sho
w/2016/ [https://perma.cc/WWP8-DS59].
146
OEC,
WHERE
DOES
RUSSIA
EXPORT
CORN
TO?
(2016),
https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/rus/show/10
05/2016/[https://perma.cc/EFT3-YLFZ].
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5.6. Turning the Global Supply Chain to Our Benefit: BITs
As a result of decades of international lobbying led by the United
States, the global marketplace is governed by a web of
approximately 2,700 bilateral investment agreements and treaties
including investment provisions, which give private parties a direct
cause of action.147 The DIP would—in addition and as an auxiliary
to its pursuit of regional agreements to maximize global supply
chain opportunities—assist private parties in leveraging those BITs
to identify and challenge barriers to market access. Our trade policy
could, for instance, give loans for legal fees in meritorious cases, act
as a clearinghouse to pool similarly situated companies, and
otherwise provide the resources of the government to assist in
litigation objectives.
5.7. International Transitioning
Effective measures to upgrade domestic and international trade
policy to GEC 3.0, such as those described above, will in some
circumstances run afoul of core principles of GEC 2.0 like the
national treatment, anti-discrimination principle. As we explained
in Part I, the GEC is a constitutional construct that does not require
timeless application of equally applied norms across generations.
For example, distinguishing among economic actors based on their
historical circumstances has been at the root of the trade provisions
protecting industries in early stages of development in emerging
economies. The rationale is simple: in order to meaningfully
participate in the globalized markets, an industry must have
reached a sufficiently advanced stage of development. Otherwise,
it will not be able to compete with foreign actors. In other words, in
order to consolidate the national base necessary to be a competitive
GEC 2.0 actor, states that did not have a meaningful opportunity to
develop during GEC 1.0—primarily because of colonization—could
See generally ANDREW PAUL NEWCOMBE & LUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE
INVESTMENT TREATIES (2009) (delineating the historical development of
investment treaty law). For a listing of international investment agreements,
including bilateral investment agreements and treaties including investment
provisions, see United Nations UNCTAD, International Investment Agreements
Navigator, INV. POL’Y HUB, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA
[https://perma.cc/H3LZ-9D6U] (last visited Nov. 23, 2018).
147
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legitimately claim the right to apply provisions that would
otherwise be trade-violative.
The same rationale pertains today. Entire regions and categories
of individuals like the Chronically Excluded Classes cannot
meaningfully compete in GEC 3.0. Bringing them on to the playing
field will, inevitably, entail a suspension of some foundational
principles. An American worker who learns automation skills in an
EEC program with a view to participating in an infrastructure
project managed by the federal government should be allowed to
bid free of competition from foreign competitors. In this instance, a
“Buy American” domestic program specifically designed to benefit
a class of people that has not become a stakeholder in the trade
system should be excluded from the prohibition against
protectionism.148 Likewise, a pause is needed to enable the United
States to negotiate the discrete and focused tariff reduction
agreements described above.
As Robert Schuman famously declared in his 1950 Declaration,
economic and political integration is a long-haul project that evolves
through the practical achievement of milestones that are consistent
with an overall vision.149 The rule of international law consistently
applied to all WTO members is a relatively recent phenomenon. The
international commercial system has more often than not been a
Hobbesian world where power drove outcomes. The United States
historically exercised its power to enable free movement of goods
and services and create a globalized market for decades, starting
most significantly with the massive investment in Europe’s
reconstruction through the Marshall Plan.150 Today, the system may
be saved again if power is respected for the rule of law to continue
to prevail.

148 See Spence, supra note 117, at 38–39 (identifying as a starting objective an
agreement that “restoring rewarding employment opportunities for a full spectrum
of Americans should be a fundamental goal.”).
149 See Schuman, supra note 69 (“Europe will not be made all at once, or
according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which
first create a de facto solidarity.”).
150 See generally BENN STEIL, THE MARSHALL PLAN: DAWN OF THE COLD WAR
(2018) (discussing the importance of the Marshall Plan and how it “promised a
continuing energetic U.S. presence, underwritten by a reindustrialized capitalist
Germany, at the heart of an integrated, capitalist western Europe.”).
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6. CONCLUSION
Explaining the causes of the challenges to the legitimacy of the
international economic order and the rise of what has been called
economic nationalism obviously falls beyond the scope of a single
project. As we explained in the Introduction, we confine ourselves
in this article to the foundational architecture of the international
trade norms and institutions. Other projects, of course, look to other
facets of this problematic order, including the cultural alienation
that many believe the Chronically Excluded and other groups have
been experiencing. Our intention here is to steer the current course
towards a reform of domestic and economic policy to adjust to the
new GEC 3.0 conditions. Once in motion, GEC 3.0 will grow and
find its way to stability, like its predecessor did. There is no
alternative. History teaches that failure to begin to upgrade will
result in a systemic failure.151 Now is the time to take action and
avoid the mistakes of the past.

151 See, e.g., JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE
PEACE (2007) (discussing the untenable economic order established after World War
I and the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, and arguing for a more generous peace).
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